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ABSTRACT 
 
The severity of several chemical incidents occurred in the recent past has been 
attributed to improper layout arrangement or proximity of a chemical facility to a densely 
populated area although this is not a new problem. To address this problem, researchers 
have been considering not just economic efficacy but also safety features in layout 
optimization. Therefore, there is still a need for a comprehensive risk assessment 
methodology in combination with the layout optimization formulation. Moreover, risk 
probability distributions should be employed to enhance understanding of overall risks 
and to support decision making during the design phase. The objective of this study is to 
incorporate a probabilistic risk assessment into the design optimization formulation. The 
methodology was divided in three main parts.  
First, a risk assessment program has been developed in MATLAB to estimate risks 
associated with human life losses and structural damage in a chemical plant. Analytical  
models for fire and explosion scenarios and toxic chemical releases were included in the 
program. Monte Carlo simulation was then employed to propagate uncertainties attributed 
to environemtal conditions and release paramenters. The proposed program  generates risk 
maps  and risk distributions at a particular point of interest in a timely manner.  
Second, domino effect concepts have been included in the resulting program to 
obtain minimal separation distances between process units necessary to prevent escalation 
events. These distances vary according the targeted unit type, escalation vector 
(overpressure or fire impigement) and the risk acceptability criteria.  
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In the last stage, risk maps and safety distances are included in a mixed-integer 
linear programming (MILP) for layout optimization.  The objective function is set to 
minimize the total capital cost associated with structural damage risk, fatality risk,  
pipeline interconnection, and  protective devices.  Individual risk criteria was applied as 
an additional constraint for high occupancy buildings, meaning that the overall risk for 
buildings such as control room or lab may not exceed this criterion.  
The proposed methodology has been demonstrated through a case study. It 
enhanced flexibility during the layout arrangement allowing the user not just include  site-
specific data but also the risk acceptance criteria, which reflects the company’s safety 
culture. 
 
 iv 
 
DEDICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my loved ones who make my life longer and meaningful 
 v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to many people who have supported me 
during the last two years. I was very lucky to find wonderful persons who have made my 
journey much more enjoyable and excited. 
First of all, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. M. Sam Mannan, for accepting 
me as a master’s student. I am very proud of being part of the Mary Kay O’Connor Process 
Safety Center.  The great atmosphere he has built at the Center was vital for me to 
complete this research. I also would like to thank my committee members, Dr. Mahmoud 
El-Halwagi, and Dr. Cesar O. Malave, for spending their time to serve on my committee.   
Within the Center, I need to thank my team leader Dr. Noor Quddus for helping 
me out during all stages of my research, starting from the definition of the problem 
statement until the revision of my thesis.   I also want to thank all the staff, especially Ms. 
Valerie Green, for the hard work taking a good care of us, and keeping the Center running  
  Thanks also to my friends for making my time at Texas A&M University an 
unforgettable experience. I hope our friendship last for many more years.  I also want to 
extend gratitude to my sponsor the Coordination for the Improvement of Higher Education 
Personnel (CAPES) for providing me financial support to accomplish a dream.    
Finally, thanks to all my family, especially my mother and sister, for always 
believing in me even when I question myself. I also want to thank my lovely girlfriend for 
encouraging me and being by my side every time I needed her support.   
 vi 
 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
API American Petroleum Institute 
BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion 
BM Britter and McQuaid Model 
CCPS Center of Chemical Process Safety 
CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics  
DEGADIS Dense Gas Dispersion Model 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency  
GIS Geographic Information Systems 
GPM Gaussian Passive Model   
HSE Health and Safety Executive  
ISD Inherently Safer Design  
LFL Lower Flammability Limit    
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas  
LOC Loss of Containment  
MCE Most Credible Events  
MILP Mixed-integer Linear Programming  
MINLP Mixed-integer Non-linear Programming  
OGP  International Association of Oil & Gas Producers  
OSHA  Occupational Safety and Health Administration  
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis  
 vii 
 
RAC Risk Acceptance Criteria   
SD Safety Distance 
TC Total Cost  
TDC Total Damage Cost  
TNO Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research 
TNT Trinitrotoluene 
UFL Upper Flammability Limit   
VCE Vapor Cloud Explosion 
 
 
 viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................ii 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... v 
NOMENCLATURE .......................................................................................................... vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x 
LIST OF TABLES ...........................................................................................................xii 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Motivation ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Literature Review ................................................................................................ 4 
1.3 Objectives ............................................................................................................ 7 
1.4 Thesis Organization ............................................................................................. 8 
2. SOURCE, GAS DISPERSION, AND IGNITION MODELING .............................. 10 
2.1 Source Term Modeling ...................................................................................... 10 
2.2 Gas Dispersion Modeling .................................................................................. 16 
2.3 Ignition Probability Modeling ........................................................................... 30 
3. CONSEQUENCE MODELING ................................................................................ 33 
3.1 Vapor Cloud Explosion Modeling .................................................................... 34 
3.2 Flash Fire  .......................................................................................................... 36 
3.3 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion ..................................................... 37 
3.4 Jet Fire ............................................................................................................... 42 
3.5 Pool Fire ............................................................................................................ 44 
3.6 Impact Modeling ............................................................................................... 46 
 
ix 
Page 
4. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................. 49
4.1 Overview of the Methodology .......................................................................... 50 
4.2 Safety Distances to Prevent Domino Effect ...................................................... 58 
5. LAYOUT OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION ........................................................ 63
5.1 General Description ........................................................................................... 63 
5.2 Sets, Scalars, and Parameters ............................................................................ 64 
5.3 Variables ............................................................................................................ 65 
5.4 Constraints ......................................................................................................... 66 
5.5 Inherently Safety Zones and Mitigation Systems Constraints .......................... 68 
5.6 Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC) ....................................................................... 70 
5.7 Objective Function ............................................................................................ 70 
6. CASE STUDY ........................................................................................................... 73
6.1 Case Description ............................................................................................... 73 
6.2 Results and Discussion ...................................................................................... 78 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK ................................................................ 92
7.1 Conclusions ....................................................................................................... 92 
7.2 Future Work ...................................................................................................... 94 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 96 
APPENDIX A ................................................................................................................ 101 
APPENDIX B ................................................................................................................ 103 
APPENDIX C ................................................................................................................ 104 
 x 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
Figure 1 Global overview of proposed methodology................................................. 8 
Figure 2 Flow chart of the source term models ........................................................ 16 
Figure 3 Flammable cloud from a continuous source .............................................. 24 
Figure 4 Bowtie analysis for instantaneous releases ................................................ 33 
Figure 5 Bowtie analysis for continuous releases .................................................... 34 
Figure 6 Possible outcomes scenarios based on process conditions ........................ 52 
Figure 7 Methodology used for current research explaining how 
consequence model and frequency estimation are combined to 
estimate the risk of each outcome scenario ............................................... 53 
Figure 8 Different numbers of leak points according to the user 
specifications ............................................................................................. 57 
Figure 9 Visual representation of inherently safety zones ....................................... 68 
Figure 10 Flow diagram of the distillation unit.......................................................... 74 
Figure 11 Risk maps for the distillation unit. ............................................................. 79 
Figure 12 Risk curves at the facility center line in the east direction ........................ 80 
Figure 13 Boxplots of risk values at 10m, 50m and 80m from the 
distillation unit in the east direction ........................................................... 81 
Figure 14 Domino effect frequencies profiles (mean values) according to 
the distances from the distillation module for storage tanks as 
target units.................................................................................................. 82 
Figure 15 Resulting layouts for mean values of risk maps; each condition 
(a-d) corresponds to different safe distances combination ........................ 85 
 
 
 xi 
 
Page 
Figure 16 Resulting layouts for the 95th percentile of risk values; each 
condition (a-d) corresponds to different safe distances 
combination ............................................................................................... 85 
Figure 17 Costs contributions for total layout cost applying mean risk 
values ......................................................................................................... 88 
Figure 18 Costs contributions for total layout cost applying the 95th 
percentile risk values ................................................................................. 89 
Figure 19 Comparison between the result from Jung et al. (2010) and the 
proposed methodology ............................................................................... 90 
 
 
 xii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Page 
Table 1 Accidents related to poor facility siting ....................................................... 2 
Table 2 Parameters to calculate the Monin-Obukhov length.................................. 20 
Table 3 Mixing height estimation ........................................................................... 21 
Table 4 Recommended coefficients to calculate the dispersion 
parameters .................................................................................................. 23 
Table 5 Approximation of the curves in the Britter-McQuaid 
Correlations ................................................................................................ 27 
Table 6 Estimates of the curves from the Britter-McQuaid Workbook 
for instantaneous release ............................................................................ 29 
Table 7 Expressions for BLEVE parameters .......................................................... 41 
Table 8 Correlations for jet fire parameters ............................................................ 43 
Table 9 Probit correlations for different types of exposure .................................... 47 
Table 10 Frequency release for steel process pipe .................................................... 54 
Table 11 Estimation of initiating events probability................................................. 55 
Table 12 Escalation vector resulted from different primary events .......................... 60 
Table 13 Damage thresholds  and safety distances to prevent escalation................. 62 
Table 14 List of process equipment and process conditions..................................... 74 
Table 15 List of release scenarios ............................................................................. 75 
Table 16 Wind directions and their respective probabilities for the plant 
site .............................................................................................................. 76 
Table 17 Description of facilities inside the plant .................................................... 77 
 
 xiii 
 
Page 
Table 18 Minimum separation distances .................................................................. 77 
Table 19 Parameters for protective devices .............................................................. 77 
Table 20 Distances from the distillation module and its respective 
frequency of secondary events for a storage tank ...................................... 83 
Table 21 Distances from the large storage tank and its respective 
frequency of secondary events for storage tank......................................... 83 
Table 22 Safe distances applied during layout optimization .................................... 84 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Motivation  
Facility siting and layout configuration are critical factors in the design and the 
expansion of an industrial installation. Determination of the relative position of units or 
process equipment is a complex task that requires a systematic analysis, which accounts 
not only economic efficiency but also other aspects such as operability, sustainability, and 
safety. In addition to the maintenance costs minimization, “optimal facility and layout” 
can build inherently safer designs and, consequently, reduce the “risk of losses” during 
plant operation [1].  
During the last decades, there have been several chemical incidents of which 
severity can be attributed to improper layout arrangement or proximity of a chemical 
facility to a densely populated area (Table 1). One of the well-known incidents related to 
a poor layout is the Texas City Refinery explosion that happened on March of 2005, in 
which the high number of fatalities was caused due the inadequate distance between 
occupied portable trailers and the isomerization unit.  At the moment of the incident, a 
flammable vapor cloud exploded destroying all trailers located within 121 feet from the 
release, and killing 15 workers; the blast waves also damaged a trailer 600 feet from the 
ISOM unit [2]. In response to this disaster, API released in 2007 the RP 753- Management 
of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings [3] to address 
the siting of portable trailers, which was further incorporated as a standard practice under 
OSHA Process Safety Management guidelines.  
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Table 1: Accidents related to poor facility siting 
 
 
 
Others high-consequence incidents have been related to poor facility siting and 
layout decisions. On March of 2004, a series of explosions and fires took place at Skikda 
LNG facility in Algeria claiming twenty-seven lives and injuring around eighty others 
[13].  The proximity of inhabited buildings such as control room, administrative office, 
and maintenance building to the hazardous unit was the major factor in the number of 
deaths and injuries, which were mostly caused by debris impact [14].  In a similar way, in 
1989 at Phillips 66 facility, a massive vapor cloud ignited leading to a series of other 
Year Location Fatalities Description 
2013 West Fertilizer 
Company[4] 
15 Ammonium nitrate storage 
2011 Chemie-Pack, The 
Netherlands 
0 Fire at chemical storage (resin and 
xylene) 
2008 Imperial Sugar, GA[5] 14 Sugar dust explosion and fire 
2006 Danvers, MA[6] 0 Heptane and alcohols 
2005 Texas City, TX 15 Pentane/hexane release 
2005 Buncefield, England[7] 0 Fire and explosion at oil storage 
2005 Point Comfort, TX[6] 0 Propylene release 
2001 Toulouse, France[8] 30 Ammonium  Nitrate Storage 
explosion 
1999 Allentown, PA[6] 5 Hydroxylamine decomposition 
1998 Mustang, NV[6] 4 High explosives 
1992 La Mede, France[9] 6 LPG leak 
1989 Pasadena, TX [7] 23 Isobutane and ethylene release 
1988 Norco, LA[9] 8 Explosion in the catalytic cracking 
unit 
1984 Mexico City[6] 542 LPG line rupture 
1984 Bhopal[10] >2,000 Methylisocyanate release 
1978 Texas City, TX[6] 7 Isobutane sphere failure 
1976 Seveso[11] 0 Trichlorophenol release 
1974 Flixborough, UK[7] 28 Cyclohexane release 
1962 Brandenburg, KY[12] 1 Ethylene oxide explosion 
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explosions  killing  twenty-three employees,  many of whom were inside control rooms 
and other occupied buildings nearby the reactor unit [15].  
Those mentioned incidents expose the importance of considering safety aspects 
during facility and layout decision. According to the Center of Chemical Process Safety 
(CCPS), there are three main types of siting analysis methodologies which are mostly used 
by industries to address safety features: consequence-based, lookup tables and risk-based 
[16]. Although many attention has been given to the risk-based design approach for several 
years, there is still a conflict of opinions regarding the benefits of this analysis among 
companies, contractors, and legislators [17]. As a result, its application is not as 
widespread as the others [17].  
In consequence-based approach, the separation distances between units in the same 
facility and/or surroundings are established according to the effects of the maximum 
credible event (MCE) scenarios, characterized by the most likely scenarios with the 
greatest consequences that represent each possible type of hazard (e.g. explosion, fire, and 
toxic release) [4]. Besides the fact that this approach may have good results regarding the 
safety aspects, in most of the cases they are not economically viable [17].   
Contrary to the consequence-based approach, the risk-based analysis considers the 
range of all possible scenarios. It requires a good understating of the frequency and the 
consequences associated with each potential event. In the end, the separation distance is 
obtained according to the risk acceptance criteria for the determined facility which can be 
related to individual or population risks. Besides the cost-benefit, it enhances more 
flexibility to the installation design by inserting the facility specificities with the use of 
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probabilistic methods. However, the number of variables grows exponentially with the 
system complexity and an extensive amount of time is required to perform this analysis. 
Differing from the others methodologies, the lookup table is based on historical 
events and good engineering practice.  The problem of using this approach is that it may 
not reflect the relative risk, and its efficacy in preventing or mitigating a dangerous event 
is not confirmed [4]. 
Therefore, the motivation of this study is to expand the usage of probabilistic risk 
methods earlier in the design stage of chemical installations in a timely manner, in other 
to minimize the risk of losses related to them, applying concepts that are believed to 
enhance safety but have been not widely used in this field.  
 
1.2 Literature Review  
1.2.1 Layout Optimization and Risk Analysis  
Applying numerical methods to solve the layout problem is not a new subject of 
study. In the 70s, the “quadratic assignment problem” was used to allocate a number of 
production facilities based on the minimization of flow costs between facilities [18].  Since 
then, several different approaches have been applied to support plant layout decisions. 
Heuristic rules were suggested by many studies with no guarantee of the global optimality 
[19]. Additionally, graph partitioning problems were employed to determine the layout for 
single floor units.    
Only after 1996 with the work published by Penteado and Ciric [20],  safety 
considerations became part of reformulation problem. This method is formulated as 
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mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) to minimize the objective function 
composed of four factors- piping costs, land costs, the cost of protective devices, and 
financial risks associated with process safety incidents. These two last terms introduced 
the concept of process safety into layout optimization. Protective devices are used to 
prevent initiating events or minimize the effects on targeted units while financial risks 
include costs related to  potential losses scaled by the frequency of occurrence [20].  
Subsequently to the publication of Penteado and Ciric, this topic became very 
popular in the academia, and several different reformulations have been proposed to 
combine layout configuration and safety aspects. Patsiatzis and  Papageorgiou 
incorporated  the Dow Fire and Explosion Index into a mixed-integer linear programming 
(MILP) to consider probable damage losses and safety constraints [19]. The main 
advantage of using a linear model is the assurance of “global optimality” applying 
standard branch-and-bound solution techniques [19].   
In recent years, quantitative risk assessment (QRA) started to be incorporated in 
the layout problem. Vázquez-Román et al. [21]  and Díaz-Ovalle et al. [22] employed 
stochastic analysis such as Monte Carlo simulation with MINLP  to account for 
uncertainties related to toxic release scenarios in an installed facility. However, structural 
damage costs were neglected, and safety was considered only due to fatality from toxic 
chemicals releases. In 2010, Jung et al.[9] adopted  a MILP formulation in combination 
with probit functions to minimize total layout costs in a grid-based taking into account  
potential economic losses due to boiling liquid expansion vapor explosion (BLEVE) and 
vapor cloud explosion (VCE); later on, to overcome the limitations of grid-based 
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formulation, a new approach was proposed for continuous plane [7]. In this context, 
Medina-Herrera et al. [23]  expanded the quantitative risk analysis to additional  fire 
scenarios such as flash fire and jet fire into a MINLP formulation.  In terms of risk 
reduction to the public and workers,  Han et al. [24] imposed extras constraints on safety 
distances, delimiting what  was called “risk zones” corresponding to areas where risk is 
above the acceptance criteria and should be avoided by the community and occupied 
buildings. Nevertheless, these methodologies have not accounted for uncertainties or low 
consequence events in a complete risk assessment, especially when it comes to fire and 
explosion scenarios.  
Regarding domino effect prevention, a MINLP formulation was proposed by 
Lopez-Molina et al. [25]  to optimize the facility layout based on the minimal probability 
of escalation events. In a distinct approach, Lira-Flores et al. [26] incorporated the Domino 
Hazard Index aiming the minimization of risk attributed to escalation events. Regarding 
the risk to the general public,  Bernechea and Arnaldos [27] developed a method to support 
decision-making process during design stage employing inherently safer design (ISD) 
concepts and QRA.  Domino effect was considered into QRA and plays an important role 
during the selection of possible facility layouts.  
To conclude, the facility layout planning has been received much attention over 
the last years. However, in most of the studies, the risk is still calculated as a single value, 
and the uncertainties are not included in the formulation. Based on that, the use of the risk 
distributions should be incorporated in the design phase. It enhances the understanding of 
the overall risk and support the decision making during layout arrangement.  
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1.3 Objectives  
Even though there are several reported studies incorporating safety into the layout 
optimization, there is a need for a method that combines layout optimization and a detailed 
risk assessment including uncertainties to estimate the risk.  The main goal of this research 
is to apply a risk-based approach to the layout optimization of a chemical plant regarding 
the minimization of the total layout costs and risk.  Specific objectives of the present work 
are summarized as: 
 The first objective is to provide a tool that performs a probabilistic risk 
assessment in a chemical facility processing  hazardous materials. The final 
program will propagate uncertainties associated with environmental 
conditions, failure data as well as release parameters. In the end, risk maps 
will be obtained representing the potential of human life losses and 
structural damage; 
 the second objective, is to estimate inherently safety distances that prevent 
escalation events  applying minimal threshold values; 
 the third and last objective is to incorporate risk mapping and safety 
distances into design optimization problem. Additional safety constraints 
will be employed to account risk acceptance criteria (RAC) and mitigation 
systems into the facility arrangement.  
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1.4 Thesis Organization  
Three stages were proposed and followed (see Figure 1) in order to achieve the 
main goals mentioned in the previous section. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Global overview of proposed methodology 
 
 
 
 First, a literature review was conducted to understand all the steps of quantitative 
risk analysis. Since there was no available model implemented in Matlab, it was very 
challenging and time consuming for the authors to finalize this stage. In this context, 
Section 2 summarizes all models used for the initial phase of a QRA; it englobes source 
term modeling and gas dispersion models. An additional subsection describes how ignition 
probabilities are predicted in case of flammable materials. As part of risk assessment, 
Section 3 describes the consequence analysis fundamentals taking into account fire and 
explosion scenarios as well as toxic releases.  
•Collect Data;
•Perform Monte 
Carlo simulation. 
Risk 
Mapping 
•Define threshold 
values;
•Apply the proposed 
stochastic approach. 
Safety 
Distances
•Include RAC and 
cost parameters; 
•MILP 
formulation.
Layout 
Optimization
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Section  4 introduces the proposed methodology to obtain risk maps, which consist 
in an extension of the studies performed by Alghamdi [28]  and Ramirez et al.[29]. It is 
also described the procedures to estimate minimal separation distances for prevention of 
escalation events, which is part of the secondary stage of this study.  
Section 5 demonstrates the layout formulation applied (third and last stage). A 
grid-based approach is used based on the work proposed by Jung et al. [9] with additional 
features to account for risk acceptance criteria and risk zones delimited by minimal 
separation distances.  
Section 6 shows the applicability of the overall methodology in a case study 
involving a distillation unit that separates hexane and heptane.  
Finally, Section 7 summarizes the conclusions and recommendations for the future 
work in this field.     
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2. SOURCE, GAS DISPERSION, AND IGNITION MODELING 
 
2.1 Source Term Modeling 
Source models are applied to estimate discharge rate, release duration, amount of 
released chemical, and fraction of vaporization from a fluid discharge [30]. These models 
are essential for risk assessment since their results determine the extension and size of 
vapor clouds and jet flames, which is necessary for consequence modeling. Several models 
are available, and their application may vary according to the material physical properties, 
discharge phase, and leakage source. For complex chemical plants, more than one source 
model may be required, and the most conservative results should be selected [31].  
Release mechanisms are affected by the physical state of the material [30, 31]. If 
the material is stored as a gas or vapor, a jet of gas or vapor is formed during discharge. 
However, if the chemical is stored as a liquid,  many outcomes are possible. For 
pressurized fluids at a temperature above its boiling point, the escaping fluid will partially 
flash into vapor when released to atmospheric pressure. A substantial amount of liquid 
may be entrained in gas as droplets. Part of the liquid may remain suspended as an aerosol 
and then evaporate while some may rainout onto the ground.  A boiling liquid pool is 
likely to be formed by the remaining liquid which will result in extra vapor emission into 
the air. If a volatile fluid is kept under normal conditions, the release will first form a liquid 
pool which will subsequently evaporate.  
For this work, flow through a hole was considered, and discharge rate was assumed 
constant to assure a conservative result. Additionally, three source models were applied 
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according to the phase of the material stored: gas/vapor, non-flashing liquid or flashing 
liquid.  For flashing liquids,  the fraction of aerosol formed was assumed to be the same 
amount as the liquid vaporized [31]. Details of each source model are explained in the 
following sections  
 
2.1.1  Flow of Gas or Vapor Through Holes Modeling  
According to CCPS, discharge models are governed by mechanical energy 
balance, which is typically represented as:  
∫
dP
ρ
P2
P1
+
g
gc
(z2 − z1) +
1
2gc
(v2
2 − v1
2) +∑ef +
Ws
ṁ
= 0 (2.1) 
where P is the pressure (force/area), 𝜌 is the density (mass/volume), 𝑔 is the gravity 
acceleration (length/time2), 𝑔𝑐 is the gravitational constant (force/mass-acceleration), 𝑧 is 
the vertical height (length), 𝑣 is the fluid velocity (length/time), ∑𝑒𝑓 is the frictional loss 
term (length2/time2) ,𝑊𝑠 is the shaft work (energy/time), and  ?̇? is the mass flow rate 
(mass/time).  
When gas discharges through a hole, the gas expands as pressure drops. Internal 
energy due to pressure is then converted into kinetic energy, and parameters such as 
density, pressure, and temperature change as the gas is being released. 
If the mechanical energy balance is integrated along an isentropic path, the 
discharge rate can be determined by equation (2.2). This equation assumes ideal gas, 
adiabatic expansion, and no external work.  
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ṁ = C0AP0√
2gcM
RT
γ
γ − 1
[(
P
P0
)
2/γ
− (
P
P0
)
(γ+1)/γ
]
̇
 (2.2) 
where C0 is the discharge coefficient (dimensionless), A is the area of the hole (length
2), 
P0 is the upstream pressure (force/area), γ is the heat capacity ratio (Cp/Cv ), M is the 
molecular weight of the gas (mass/mole),  R is the ideal gas constant (pressure-
volume/mole-deg), T is the upstream temperature (deg), and P is the downstream pressure 
(force/area). 
Typically in risk analysis, maximum flow rate is needed to assure conservative 
results. The maximum value is reached when the velocity of an escaping fluid is equivalent 
to sonic velocity. At this point, downstream pressure does not affect flow, which depends 
exclusively on  upstream pressure [30]. The choked flow can be estimated by the following 
equation.  
ṁ = C0AP0√
γgcM
RT
(
2
γ + 1
)
(γ+1)/(γ−1)
 (2.3) 
The maximum downstream pressure required to reach choke flow can be 
determined by: 
Pchoked
P
= (
2
γ + 1
)
γ/(γ−1)
 (2.4) 
If downstream pressure is below Pchoked, resulted flow will be maximum, and 
equation (2.3) can be employed to estimate the release rate. Otherwise, equation (2.2) is 
used to calculate the discharge rate at the beginning of the release.  For a conservative 
estimation, it is recommended a value of 1 for discharge coefficient.  
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2.1.2  Flowing of Liquid Through a Hole  
Liquid discharges usually result from the pressure difference between stored fluid 
and atmospheric conditions. During the release, internal energy of fluid is converted into 
kinetic energy, which is then converted into thermal energy due to frictional forces 
between the escaping fluid and the equipment wall.  Considering that density remains 
constant as fluid escapes through a small orifice, equation (2.1) can be directly integrated 
with the following result:  
ṁ = ρC0A√2[𝑔𝑐(P0 − P1) + 𝑔ℎ𝑙] (2.5) 
where ℎ𝑙 is the liquid height inside the tank.  
The discharge coefficient represents the frictional loss term. For small orifices, it 
is recommended to use a value of 1 for discharge coefficient when Reynolds number 
exceeds 30,000 [30]. At these conditions, hole size does not influence exit velocity.  
 
2.1.3 Flashing Liquids  
Any pressurized liquid stored at a temperature above the boiling temperature will 
partially flash into vapor when released into atmospheric conditions resulting in two-phase 
flow. Vaporization happens so quickly that it can be considered adiabatic. The energy 
presented in the superheated liquid evaporates part of the fluid. Equation (2.6) represents 
the fraction of liquid vaporized.  
fv =
mv
m
=
Cp(T0 − Tb)
∆Hv
 (2.6) 
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where Cpthe heat capacity of the fluid, ∆Hv is the heat of vaporization, T0 is initial 
temperature of the fluid, and Tb is the boiling temperature.    
Two-phase flows can be classified as either nonreactive or reactive. The second 
case occurs when exothermic chemical reactions take place, and, for the sake of 
simplification, it is not included in the model. Nonreactive two-phase flows occur when a 
liquid is discharged from processing equipment. For flashing liquid flowing through holes 
and pipes, two considerations should be accounted: subcooled liquid or liquid under 
saturation pressure. If the fluid is stored at a pressure higher than the saturation pressure 
(subcooled liquid), non-equilibrium conditions may exist if the fluid path length of the 
release is not long enough to allow the fluid flash within the hole. Therefore, the liquid 
will vaporize at the exterior of the equipment.  
On the other side, equilibrium conditions are reached if the fluid path length is 
greater than 0.1 m, and the flow can be assumed choked [31].  For the model, it was 
assumed only equilibrium conditions and the mass flow rate is estimated by equation (2.7).  
ṁ = AC0√2ρg(P − Psat) (2.7) 
For liquids stored at saturation conditions, Equation (2.7) is no longer applicable. 
A more detailed approach should be considered to account kinetic  energy contribution 
[31]. Equation (2.8) estimates the mass flow rate for equilibrium conditions at saturation 
conditions and it is included in the model.  
ṁ =
∆HvA
vfg
√
gc
TCp
 (2.8) 
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Fraction of aerosol formed was assumed to be the same as the liquid vaporized 
[31]. Therefore, if vaporization factor  (𝑓𝑣)  exceeds 0.5, fluid escapes entirely as a vapor 
stream. Resulting discharge rates for both vapor (?̇?𝑣) and liquid phase (?̇?𝑙) can be 
estimated by following relations.  
If fv < 0.5, 
ṁv = 2ṁfv  (2.9) 
ṁl = ṁ(1 − 2fv) (2.10) 
Else, if fv > 0.5, 
ṁv = ṁ (2.11) 
ṁl = 0 (2.12) 
Figure 2 shows the flowchart used to calculate mass flow rate for escaping fluids 
in the model. If discharging fluid is only in the liquid phase, then the next step consists in 
including the mass flow rate into a consequence modeling, which is described in Section 
3. However, if the fluid escapes as vapor or two-phase, mass flow rate of the vapor phase 
is then fed into the dispersion model to predict vapor cloud size and concentration at a 
particular point. The dispersion models included in the model are described in the next 
section.  
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Figure 2: Flow chart of the source term models 
 
 
 
2.2 Gas Dispersion Modeling  
Hazardous materials, when released to the environment, are diluted and carried off 
by wind [32]. If the material is flammable and/or explosive, a vapor cloud may form and 
ignite causing damage due to the overpressure and/or irradiation. Additionally, if the 
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chemical has toxic effects, its concentration inside the cloud may cause deaths or 
permanent injuries to both employees and society. Thus, dispersion models should be 
employed to assess the risk of a chemical facility.  
Choosing the proper dispersion model is not a straightforward task. It depends on 
several site-related parameters such as environmental conditions, level of obstruction, 
release direction, physical properties of the material, and discharge rate [33]. A large 
number of dispersion models is available in the public domain to perform dispersion 
analysis (e.g., ALOHA, SLAB, DEGADIS, and INPUFF). They can be characterized 
mainly into two groups: dense gas models, and neutrally buoyant dispersion models. Most 
of these models are recommended by regulatory agencies such as US EPA. However, they 
are limited to open air releases and do not account for the effect of confinement and 
obstacles. In cases where confined and congested areas play an important role (e.g., 
offshore facilities), more sophisticated models are required. Computational fluid dynamic 
(CFD) is a good alternative for those cases. However, it requires either long computation 
time and high level of expertise [34].  
For the methodology proposed, two gas dispersion models were employed. The 
Gaussian plume model was used to simulate the neutrally buoyant dispersion of gases 
while the dispersion of heavier-than-air gases was predicted by the Britter and Mcquaid 
model [32]. Both methods were chosen due to their simplicity and robustness, which 
reduce the computation time while still give valid results.  
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2.2.1  Gaussian Plume Model  
Passive dispersions occur when material dispersion (puff or vapor cloud) is mainly 
governed by atmospheric turbulence [32]. For constant atmospheric turbulence and wind 
velocity, the material concentration follows a Gaussian distribution in all directions. To 
predict passive dispersion, the Gaussian plume models (GPM) has been extensively used 
[32]. It can be employed for neutrally buoyant dispersions of gases at low concentrations, 
in the range of ppm [31].   
Dispersion modeling expressions mentioned in equations (2.13) to (2.25) were 
obtained from the TNO “Yellow Book” [32]. At the first moment, it is shown equations 
to determine the variation of wind speed and mixing height. Then, the expression to 
estimate the concentration for both continuous and instantaneous release are mentioned. 
Finally, a procedure to calculate the flammability zone in case of a flammable material 
release is described.   
Vertical variation of the wind speed can be calculated  given the wind speed at a 
particular height, surface roughness length (z0), and the Monin-Obukhov length, L. The 
vertical variation of the wind speed is then used in combination with the atmospheric 
stability and the  Monin-Obukhov length  to predict the mixing height, which is further 
applied to estimate the concentration of the released chemical.  
 
Surface Friction Velocity  
The surface friction velocity (u*) is assessed given the wind speed at a particular 
height (ua) as follows.  
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u∗ = k.
ua(z)
f (
z
z0
, L)
          (
m
s
) (2.13) 
where parameter z can assume a maximum value of 100 m. In the model, z was fixed as 
10 m, and  wind speed was treated as a stochastic variable with values ranging from 1 to 
5 m/s. The roughness length (z0)  was determined according to the terrain classification 
[32],  and the  Monin-Obukhov length  (L) was obtained from the Pasquill-Gifford stability 
classes. Parameter 𝑘 represents the Von Karman constant, which has a value of 0.4.  
 
The Monin-Obukhov Length   
The  Monin-Obukhov length  (L) is calculated numerically using the following 
expression. 
1
L
=
1
Ls
. log10 (
z0
zs
) (2.14) 
where Ls and zs are constansts that depend on the Pasquill-Gifford stability classes, as 
shown in Table 2 . In case of class D for the atmospheric stability, equation (2.14) results 
in  1/L = 0. Finally,  function f (
z
z0
, L) is defined below.  
{
 
 f (
z
z0
, L) = ln (
z
z0
) + 5
(z − z0)
L
,                                      
   f (
z
z0
, L) = ln (
z
z0
) − φ(
z
L
) + φ(
z0
L
) ,                           
for 1/L > 0
 
for  1/L ≤ 0
 (2.15) 
where,  
φ(
z
L
) = 2 ln (
1 + φ∗
2
) + ln (
1 + φ∗2
2
) − 2 arctan(φ∗) +
π
2
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φ∗ = (1 −
16z
L
)
1/4
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Parameters to calculate the Monin-Obukhov length [32] 
Pasquill-Gifford  
stability class 
Ls (m) zs (m) 
A 33.162 1117 
B 32.258 11.46 
C 51.787 1.324 
D ∞ (not applicable) 
E -48.330 1.262 
F -31.325 19.36 
 
 
 
 Mixing Height 
Mixing height is then obtained from the stability class and the Monin-Obukhov 
length as summarized in Table 3 . The Coriolis parameter is also included (f), which is 
defined as:  
f = 2Ωsinω (2.16) 
where 𝛺 is the earth’s rotation (7.27 10-5 s-1 ), and 𝜔 is the latitude on earth.   
 
Dispersion Equations 
After defining hi and L,  dispersion calculations can be performed. For a 
continuous released, concentration at any point is estimated by Equation (2.17).  
c(x, y, z) =  
q
ua
. Fy(x, y). Fz(x, z)       (
kg
m3
) (2.17) 
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where 𝑐(𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧) is the concentration at position (x,y,and z), 𝑢𝑎 is the wind speed (m/s), 
and 𝑞  is the release rate (kg/s). 
Corresponding equation for instantaneous release is obtained by Equation (2.18).  
c(x, y, z) =  Q. Fx(x, t). Fy(t. ua, y). Fz(t. ua, z)       (
kg
m3
) (2.18) 
where 𝑡 is the time after the release (s), 𝑄 is the total amount dischargerd (kg), and ℎ is 
the height of the discharge (m).  
 
 
 
Table 3: Mixing height estimation [32] 
1/L Stability Class 
Mixing Height 
hi (m) 
>0 F,E,D 0.4√
u∗
f
L 
0 D 
Minimun value of  
0.2 u*/f or 500 m 
<0 
C 
B 
A 
1000 
1500 
1500 
 
 
 
In both cases,  functions Fy and Fz are equivalent. They are related to the horizontal 
and vertical dispersions respectively. Equation (2.18) has an additional term (Fx) to 
account for along-wind dispersion.  
Expressions to calculate vertical dispersion are shown below. Source term was 
considered as a point source, which means that there are neither vertical nor horizontal 
dimensions.    
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If  𝛔𝐳(𝐱) ≤ 𝟎. 𝟔. 𝐡𝐢√𝟏 − 𝐡/𝐡𝐢:  
Fz(x, z) =
1
√2π σz(x)
{exp(−
(z − h)2
2σz2(x)
) + exp (−
(z + h)2
2σz2(x)
)}  (m−1) 
(2.19) 
If  𝟎. 𝟔. 𝐡𝐢√𝟏 − 𝐡/𝐡𝐢 < 𝛔𝐳(𝐱) ≤ 𝟏. 𝟔 𝐡𝐢 : 
Fz(x, z)
=  
1
√2π σz(x)
{exp(−
(2hi − h − z)2
2σz2(x)
) + exp(−
(2hi − h + z)2
2σz2(x)
)
+ exp(−
( z − h)2
2σz2(x)
) + exp(−
(z + h)2
2σz2(x)
)+ exp (−
(2hi + h − z)2
2σz2(x)
)
+ exp(−
(2hi + h + z)2
2σz2(x)
)}                                                                   (m−1) 
(2.20) 
If 𝛔𝐳(𝐱) > 𝟏. 𝟔 𝐡𝐢 : 
Fz(x, z) =
1
hi
              (m−1) (2.21) 
The lateral dispersion parameter, Fy,  is defined by Equation (2.22).  
Fy =
1
√2πσy(x)
. exp (−
y2
2 σy2(x)
)              (m−1) (2.22) 
In the case of  instantaneous or short duration releases, along-wind dispersion must 
be included.  If the discharge is classified as instantaneous, Fx is calculated as follows:  
Fx =
1
√2πσx(uat)
. exp (−
(x − uat)
2
2 σx2(uat)
)     (m−1)          (2.23) 
However, if the material release is defined as short duration, the equation bellow 
must be applied to account release time (tr). 
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Fx =
1
2uatr
. {erf (−
x − ua(t − tr)
√2σx(uat)
) −erf (−
x − uat
√2σx(uat)
)} (m−1) (2.24) 
To calculate dispersion parameters, a practical approach was used [31, 32].   
σy(x) = a. x
b 
σz(x) = c. x
d 
σx(x) = a. x
b 
Constants a, b, c, d, e, and f differ according to the type of release (continuous or 
puff) and atmospheric stability class, as shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Recommended coefficients to calculate the dispersion parameters [31, 32] 
Release Type 
Atmospheric 
Stability 
A b c D 
Continuous 
A 0.54 0.86 0.28 0.90 
B 0.37 0.87 0.23 0.85 
C 0.21 0.87 0.22 0.80 
D 0.13 0.91 0.20 0.76 
E 0.098 0.90 0.15 0.73 
F 0.065 0.90 0.12 0.67 
Puff 
A 0.18 0.92 0.60 0.75 
B 0.14 0.92 0.53 0.73 
C 0.10 0.92 0.34 0.71 
D 0.06 0.92 0.15 0.70 
E 0.04 0.92 0.10 0.65 
F 0.02 0.89 0.05 0.61 
 
 
 
Volume of the Cloud Between Lower and Upper Flammability Limit  
The volume of a vapor cloud is required to estimate explosion impact due to a 
delay ignition. Even though most flammable materials are heavier than air, GPM is often 
used as an approximation [35]. A simplified approach was employed to calculate the cloud 
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size. For more precise solutions, partial equations should be solved analytically. For 
continuous release, volume was obtained integrating numerically the cross-sectional area 
over the center line from xufl to xlfl, which represents the positions where concentration is 
equivalent to the upper and lower flammability limits, respectively. If the maximum 
concentration is bellow UFL, xufl is set as the first point from release source where 
concentration reaches the LFL. The cross-sectional area has an ellipse shape delimited by 
the cloud height (zlfl) and width (ylfl) as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Flammable cloud from a continuous source 
 
 
 
The cloud width and height are evaluated given the concentration profiles at the 
center line and dispersion parameters.  
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ylfl(x) = σy(x)√2 ln (
c(x, 0,0)
clfl
)          (m) (2.25) 
A similar equation can be used for 𝑧𝑙𝑓𝑙. Vapor clouds that touch the ground are 
treated as half ellipsoid and the cross-sectional area is divided by 2.  
The volume of a puff resulted from an instantaneous release was calculated 
applying the formula for a sphere.  
V =
4
3
π (rlfl
3 − rufl
3 )           (m3) (2.26) 
where rufl  and rlfl are the distances from the center where concentration is equal to UFL 
and LFL, respectively. In this assumption, any point where concentration exceeds UFL 
will not ignite.   
 
2.2.2  The Britter and Mcquaid Model 
Many hazardous chemicals widely used in industry such as hydrocarbons, 
ammonia, hydrogen fluoride, and chlorine, can form vapor clouds that are heavier than air 
when released [36]. GPM already described is no longer applicable to this case, and a 
dense gas dispersion model must be employed to account negative buoyancy.  
One of the simplest and fastest ways to modeling dense gas dispersion is to use top 
hat type models. It is assumed that instantaneous releases result in cylindrical clouds while 
continuous releases lead to wedge-shaped top hat profile. The cloud concentration is 
considered uniform, without any spatial variation, but it varies with time. The 
concentration outside the cloud boundaries is then considered zero.  
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The Britter and McQuaid model (BM) is a representative of top hat models, and it 
is broadly accepted for dense gas dispersion [32]. The model is composed of a collection 
of empirical correlations between parameters that affect gas dispersion process.  The 
inputs are initial cloud size, initial discharge rate, release duration, and gas density. Wind 
speed and air density are also required.  
Before proceeding with calculations for continuous and instantaneous releases, the 
cloud buoyancy must be estimated to be further applied.  
go = g(ρo − ρa)/ρa (2.27) 
where 𝑔𝑜 is the buoyancy factor (length/time
2), 𝜌𝑜 is the density of the released chemical 
at initial conditions (mass/volume), and 𝜌𝑎 is the air density (mass/volume). 
 
2.2.3  Model for Continuous Release  
For continuous discharges, BM model presents a collection of curves to estimate 
the downwind averaged concentrations (Cmean/Co) ranged from 0.002 to 0.1. Equations 
presented in Table 5 consists of approximations of those curves and were used in the 
model; where 𝑞𝑜 is the initial discharge rate (volume/time), 𝑢 is the wind speed at 10 m 
height (length/time), and 𝑥 is the distance from the release source (length).  
To determine safe distances that prevent intoxication or ignition, the downwind 
distance (xd) needs to be estimated given a safe concentration level. Then, an upwind 
extension of the plume (xu) is calculated as follows.  
xu = 2Lb (2.28) 
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where  
Lb = qogo/u
3 (2.29)  
 
 
 
Table 5: Approximation of the curves in the Britter-McQuaid Correlations [31] 
Concentration ratio 
 
 (
𝐶𝑚
𝐶0
) 
α = log (
g0
2q0
u5
) β = log [x (
q0
u
)
1
2
⁄ ] 
0.1 
α ≤ −0.55 1.75 
−0.55 < α ≤ −0.14 0.24α + 1.88 
−0.14 < α ≤ 1 0.50α + 1.78 
0.05 
 
α ≤ −0.68 1.92 
−0.68 < α ≤ −0.29 0.36α + 2.16 
−0.29 < α ≤ −0.18 2.06 
−0.18 < α ≤ 1 −0.56α + 1.96 
0.02 
α ≤ −0.69 2.08 
−0.69 < α ≤ −0.31 0.45α + 2.39 
−0.31 < α ≤ −0.16 2.25 
−0.16 < α ≤ 1 −0.54α + 2.16 
0.01 
α ≤ −0.70 2.25 
−0.70 < α ≤ −0.29 0.49α + 2.59 
−0.29 < α ≤ −0.20 2.45 
−0.20 < α ≤ 1 −0.52α + 2.35 
0.005 
α ≤ −0.67 2.40 
−0.67 < α ≤ −0.28 0.59α + 2.80 
−0.28 < α ≤ −0.15 2.63 
−0.15 < α ≤ 1 −0.49α + 2.56 
0.002 
α ≤ −0.69 2.60 
−0.69 < α ≤ −0.25 0.39α + 2.87 
−0.25 < α ≤ −0.13 2.77 
−0.13 < α ≤ 1 −0.50α + 2.71 
 
 
 
Subsequently, the plume width b(x) is given by the following relation.  
b(x) = 2bo + 8Lb + 2.5Lb
1 3⁄ x2 3⁄  (2.30) 
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Vapor cloud height (bz) is also a function of distance from release source. It can 
be calculated using the equation below. 
bz(x) =
qo
2ub(x)
 (2.31) 
Finally, the volume of the plume can be found using expressions for b and bz.  
Vp = ∫ bz(x)
xd
0
. b(x) dx =
qoxd
2u
 (2.32) 
 
2.2.4  Model for Instantaneous Release  
Different from continuous discharges, curves applied for instantaneous releases 
give the down-wind maximum concentrations (Cmax/Co) in the range between 0.001 and 
0.1. Equations presented in Table 6 consist of approximations of those curves used. To 
determine safe distances that prevent intoxication or ignition, it is necessary first to 
estimate the downwind distance (xd) given a safe concentration level. Then, the time a 
cloud reaches distance xd should be found by the following relation. 
xd = 0.4ut + b(t) (2.33) 
where term  0.4ut represents the advection velocity, and b is the cloud radius, which is a 
function of time (t), the initial volume (Vo), and the initial cloud radius (bo).  
b(t) = √bo2 + 1.2. t √goVo (2.34) 
The mean height of the cloud is calculated by the equation below.  
bz(t) = coVo/(πb
2Cmax) (2.35) 
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 Cloud height (bz) and  cloud radius (b) are then employed to obtain the vapor 
cloud size.  
V = πb2bz (2.36) 
 
 
 
Table 6:Estimates of the curves from the Britter-McQuaid Workbook for instantaneous 
release[31] 
Concentration ratio 
 (
Cm
C0
) α = log (goVo
1
3 u2⁄ )
1
2
 
β = log (x Vo
1
3⁄ ) 
0.1 
α ≤ −0.44 0.70 
−0.44 < α ≤ −0.43 0.26α + 0.81 
−0.43 < α ≤ 1 0.93 
 α ≤ −0.56 0.85 
0.05 −0.56 < α ≤ 0.31 0.26α + 1.0 
 0.31 < α ≤ 1.0 −0.12α + 1.12 
0.02 
α ≤ −0.66 1.15 
−0.66 < α ≤ 0.32 0.34α + 1.39 
0.32 < α ≤ 1 −0.26α + 1.38 
0.01 
α ≤ −0.71 1.15 
−0.71 < α ≤ 0.37 0.34α + 1.39 
0.37 < α ≤ 1 −0.38α + 1.66 
0.005 
α ≤ −0.52 1.48 
−0.52 < α ≤ 0.24 0.26α + 1.62 
0.24 < α ≤ 1 0.30α + 1.75 
0.002 
α ≤ −0.10 2.075 
−0.10 < α ≤ 1 −0.27α + 2.05 
*𝑉𝑜 is the total discharged volume. 
 
 
 
In summary, if the gas is neutrally buoyant, GPM is applied. However, if the fluid 
escapes as vapor heavier-than-air, the Britter and McQuaid model is employed to predict 
vapor cloud size and safe distances given safe concentration of the material. 
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2.3 Ignition Probability Modeling 
Models proposed by Moosemiller [37] were used to predict ignition probabilities 
for fire and explosion scenarios. Although default values for ignition probability are 
usually applied, such as 0.15 for immediate ignition and 0.3 for delayed ignition, they do 
not account for specific release conditions that may influence probability values such as 
temperature, release material, and an ignition source. Expressions used for ignition 
probability modeling are described in the following sections.  
 
2.3.1  Immediate Ignition 
Immediate ignition (prompt ignition) is ignition that occurs near  the release source 
and early enough to prevent the formation of a large vapor cloud. The probability of this 
event occurring is a function of process conditions-  temperature (T) and pressure (P)- as 
well as material properties- auto-ignition temperature (AIT) and minimum ignition energy 
(MIE).  
Pimm.ign. = [1 − 5000e
−9.5(
T
AIT)] + [
0.0024P
1
3
MIE
2
3
] (2.33) 
where the first term is equal to 0 if T/AIT < 0.9 and equal to 1 if T/AIT > 1; and 𝑃𝑖𝑚𝑚.𝑖𝑔𝑛.  
does not exceed 1.  
 
2.3.2  Delayed Ignition 
Delayed ignition takes place when a vapor cloud is formed before finding an 
ignition source.  It may lead to a flash fire or a vapor cloud explosion depending on site 
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characteristics. The probability of delayed ignition is a function of “modifiers”, which 
depends on  flow rate (FR), minimum ignition energy (MIE) of the material, a “source 
factor” (S), and  ignition time (t) [37]. Equation (2.38) is used to estimate delayed ignition 
probabilities; each term inside the brackets represent a specific modifier.  
Pdel.ign.
= 1 −
0.7
[0.6 − 0.85 log(MIE)][7e0.642 ln(FR)−4.67][1 − (1 − S2)e−(0.015S)t]
 
(2.34) 
 
If the product of all multipliers is less than 1, equation (2.39) must be used.  
Pdel.ign.
= 0.3[0.6 − 0.85 log(MIE)][7e0.642 ln(FR)−4.67][1 − (1 − S2)e−(0.015S)t] 
(2.35) 
The first modifier accounts for the tendency of released material to ignite, and it 
has a maximum value of 3 and a minimum value of 0.1. The second modifier represents 
the influence of the amount of released material; it has an upper limit of 2. The third and 
last modifier represents the release duration and the ignition type. Parameter S in this 
factor is based on the sources of ignition present in the area of the release. It can be 
replaced with either the fraction of the cloud within a process unit, or generic values based 
on equipment density from [37]. 
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2.3.3  Delayed Explosion Probability 
An explosion may occur given a delayed ignition of a vapor cloud. The probability 
of this event occurring depends on the flow rate of flammable material (FR) and a modifier 
factor (R) to account for the material reactivity. 
Pexp = R ∗ 0.024FR
0.435 (2.36) 
where R is 0.3 for low reactivity materials (e.g. natural gas), 1 for medium reactivity 
materials (most materials), and 3 for high reactivity materials (e.g. hydrogen). 
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3. CONSEQUENCE MODELING  
 
An overview of the consequence modeling is presented in this section . Given a 
release of a flammable or toxic material, many outcomes are possible including:  vapor 
cloud explosion (VCE), boiling liquid expanding vapor concentration (BLEVE), physical 
explosions, fireballs, toxic exposure, flash fires, jet fire and pool fires. All outcome events 
implemented are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5. They were selected based on common 
scenarios that may occur in a chemical facility as mentioned by the International 
Association of Oil & Gas Producers (OGP) and CCPS [30] to give a better understanding 
of the overall risk. All models included are discussed in the following sections.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Bowtie analysis for instantaneous releases 
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Figure 5: Bowtie analysis for continuous releases 
 
 
 
3.1 Vapor Cloud Explosion Modeling  
Vapor cloud explosion is characterized by a sudden pressure increase due to 
combustion of a premixed gas. Before a VCE takes place, some conditions must be met 
[38]. First, an accidental release of a flammable material must happen in an area that is 
partially confined and congested. Then,  a delayed ignition must occur allowing the 
formation of a vapor cloud with concentrations between flammability limits. Third, 
ignition source must provide enough energy to ignite the fuel-air mixture.  
In this work, VCE was modeled according to the TNO multi-energy method [32]. 
It is required knowledge of the chemical that ignites, its quantity, level of confinement and 
congestion in the area, and relative distance from the explosion center to predict 
overpressure and impulse at a particular point.  
From the TNO chart, the scaled peak overpressure and positive phase duration 
relate with combustion energy scaled distance (𝑟′), which is defined as the distance of a 
particular point of interested from  explosion center, normalized by the amount of energy 
presented in the ignitable portion of the cloud.  
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r′ =
r
[
E
patm
]1/3
 
(3.1) 
where r is defined in meters, E is defined in joules, and pressure is defined in Pascals. The 
scaled overpressure is simply the overpressure generated by the explosion divided by the 
atmospheric pressure. 
Ps
′ = 
P
Patm
 (3.2) 
Overpressure is then applied to assess positive impulse (is).  
is =
1
2
P tp (3.3) 
This method starts with determining scaled distances of interested, followed by the 
definition of blast level curve to be used. Finally, scaled overpressures and scaled impulses 
must be read from the charts, and subsequently converted into to their real values. 
However, there are some limitations in applying graphical charts directly to the model, so 
mathematical expressions were employed to convert each curve and perform calculations 
continuously. Linear behavior is observed for all curves on a log-log scale at specific 
ranges of scaled distance, and was approached in the form:  
y = cxb (3.4) 
where b represents the slope, and c is the y –interception in log-log scale. The values for 
parameters c and b  were used as suggested by Diaz Alonso et al. [39]  and are listed in 
Appendix A.  In terms of severity, there is still a lack of guidance regarding the choice of 
severity levels. However,  the criteria proposed by Kinsella [40] can help the user during 
the selection of possible severity levels.  
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Substituting the expressions for scaled pressure, positive impulse, and relative 
distance into equations (3.2) and (3.3), we have:  
P =
coPatm[
E
Patm
]1/3
r
 
(3.5) 
is =
1
2
PcI
[
 
 
 
r
(
E
Patm
)
1 3⁄
]
 
 
 
bI
 (3.6) 
Both equations are valid for scaled distances greater than 0.6 and explosion levels 
less than or equal to 6. Results are then fed into impact modeling to predict the probability 
of deaths and structural damage.  
 
3.2 Flash Fire 
Accidental releases of flammable materials may not explode. Flash fire is a 
nonexplosive combustion of a fuel/air mixture resulted from both continuous and 
instantaneous release [38]. If a prompt ignition takes place in case of an immediate release, 
the cloud may not be significant in size and affected area would be small,  however if the 
cloud has enough time to spread among a facility before ignites, a major flash fire is likely 
to occur [36]. Based on that, only flash fire resulted from delayed ignition was considered 
in the model.  
There are a few models available to predict thermal radiation effects from a flash 
fire.  Usually, the area affected is assessed by first conducting a dispersion analysis and 
then defining the cloud burning zone from release source and half of lower flammability 
level [38].Then, it is assumed that people inside the burning zone are subjected to a fatal 
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injury while those outside does not suffer any adverse effect. The same assumption was 
applied for people inside buildings to give a conservative approach. Even though it is 
known that buildings can protect from flash fire, many uncertainties are raised to assess 
the probability the building catches fire and the likelihood of evacuation [41].   
 
3.3 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion 
According to CCPS [38], boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion (BLEVE) is ‘a 
sudden release of a large mass of pressurized superheated liquid to the atmosphere’.  This 
sudden release may occur when a pressurized vessel containing liquid “above is 
atmospheric conditions” is subject to a catastrophic failure, which can be caused by 
corrosion,  fire engulfment, equipment defects, etc  [38, 42]. The main hazards involved 
are the overpressure and the fragments created during explosion. This event is not limited 
to flammable liquids. However, if a flammable liquid is involved, an ignition will probably 
arise a fireball as a secondary effect. To assess the damage from BLEVEs,  CCPS model 
[38] was used in combination with a methodology suggested by Cuchi et al. [43]  to predict 
overpressure at a particular point. Then,  TNO model for fireball [32] is applied to 
calculate heat fluxes in case of a flammable material discharge. Effects of fragments 
impact were not considered given the high complexity of current models and their lack of 
precision. All models are described in the following sections.  
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3.3.1 Overpressure Estimation  
When a vessel fails catastrophically leading to a BLEVE, the mechanical energy 
stored in a fluid is released abruptly creating a blast strength [42]. At the moment of 
explosion, vapor phase increases in volume as pressure drops and the pressurized liquid 
flashes, strengthening pressure waves significantly.  Based on that, some researchers 
define explosion energy as the work done by a fluid in expansion on the surrounding air 
following an isentropic path. Thus, this work can be estimated by internal energy variation 
from state 1 (initial state) to state 2, when the internal pressure is equivalent to ambient 
pressure. Therefore, the available energy to create a pressure wave given a fluid in 
expansion can be calculated as follows.  
Eex = m(u2 − u1) (3.7) 
where 𝑚 is the total mass released, u1 is the specific internal energy of the fluid at process 
conditions obtained from thermodynamic tables, and u2 is the specific internal energy in 
expanded stated, which can be estimated considering an isentropic path.  
u2 = (1 − X)hf + Xhg − (1 − X)P0vf − XP0vg (3.8) 
where  
X = (h1 − hf)/(hg − hf) (3.9) 
Here h is the specific entropy, 𝑣 is the specific volume, P0 is the atmospheric 
pressure, and X is the vaporization fraction. Subscript 1 refers to initial state while 
subscripts g and f refer to saturated vapor and saturated liquid at ambient pressure, 
respectively.  
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Then, available energy is converted into TNT equivalent mass to estimate pressure 
wave from the well-known plot of overpressure vs. scaled distance.  However, in practice, 
burst power is not entirely used to generate pressure waves. Part is spent to propel vessel 
fragments while another portion is lost during vessel rupture. Consequently, a correction 
factor (β) must be applied to account this energy distribution. Cuchi et al. [43] propose the 
following expression to convert internal energy changes into TNT equivalent mass.  
WTNT = β (0.214) Eex (3.10) 
 where 0.214 is a conversion factor (0.2136 kg MJ-1); 𝐸𝑒𝑥 is defined in (bar m
3); and β is 
the correction factor that might range from 0.4 to 0.8.   
Once 𝑊𝑇𝑁𝑇 is estimated, scaled overpressure is obtained from empirical 
correlation [31]. 
Ps =
1616 [1 + (
zc
4.5)
2
]
√1 + (
zc
0.0048)
2
√1 + (
zc
0.32)
2
√1 + (
zc
1.35)
2
 (3.11) 
where zc is the scaled distance defined as 
zc =
r
WTNT
1
3
 
(3.12) 
Equivalent to VCE, results are included into impact modeling to predict the 
probability of deaths and structural damage.  
 
3.3.2 Fireball  
TNO [32] defines fireball as ‘a fire, burning sufficiently rapidly for the burning 
mass to rise into the air as cloud or ball’. As mentioned previously, if a vessel storing 
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flammable material is subjected to a BLEVE, fireball is inevitable due to auto-ignition of 
an immediate two-phase discharge.  Vapor cloud explosions can also result in fireballs. 
However such fireball is influenced by buoyancy forces, differing from those from 
BLEVE, which is governed by momentum forces [42]. In this work, only fireballs from 
BLEVE was considered given its higher destruction power.  
To predict the size, duration and radiation of a probable fireball from a BLEVE,  
following parameters must be defined [42]:  
a) the total mass of flammable material stored, 
b) the mass fraction contributing to fireball formation, 
c) the fireball behavior with time, 
d) the fireball duration and magnitude, 
e) the heat generation, 
f) the ‘view factor’, and  
g) the impact modeling due to heat exposure.  
A 14-step procedure is presented by TNO [32] to forecast the size and impact of a 
fireball from BLEVE. All steps  relate to calculation of: (i) the likely amount of chemical 
that will be released in BLEVE; (ii) fireball radius, rfb; (iii) duration time, t; (iv) fireball 
lift-off height, Hbleve; (v) the distance, X,  from the fireball center; (vi) maximum view 
factor at a specific distance X, Fview; (vii) fraction of  heat generated, Fs; (viii) the net 
available heat for combustion, ∆H; (ix) surface emissive power, SEP; (x) absorption factor 
for water vapor, αw; (xi) absorption coefficient for carbon dioxide, αw; (xiii) atmospheric 
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transmissivity, τa; and heat flux, q. Equations for each term mention above are summarized 
in Table 7 
 
 
 
Table 7: Expressions for BLEVE parameters 
Parameter Equation 
Mass of material involved  m = f x  V x ρmat (3.13) 
Fireball radius  rfb = 3.24m
0.325 (3.14) 
Duration of the fireball  t = 0.852m0.26 (3.15) 
Lift-off height Hbleve = 2rfb (3.16) 
Distance from the fireball center  X = (xbleve
2 + Hbleve
2 )
1
2 (3.17) 
Maximum view factor  Fview = (rfb X⁄ )
2 (3.18) 
Fraction of heat generated  Fs = 0.00325 Psv
0.32 (3.19) 
Net available heat for combustion  ∆H = ∆Hc − ∆HV − Cp. ∆T (3.20) 
Surface emissive power SEP = ∆H x m x 
Fs
4π. rfb
2 . t
 (3.21) 
Absorption factor of water vapor αw = 0.057 log10(Pvw  X) − 0.148 (3.22) 
Absorption factor of carbon dioxide αc = 0.0085 log10(Pvw  X) − 0.007 (3.23) 
Atmospheric transmissivity  τa = 1 − αw − αc (3.24) 
Heat flux  q′′ = SEP x Fview x τa  (3.25) 
 
 
 
where f is the volume fraction of the tank filled with flammable material; V is the tank 
volume (m3); ρmat is the material density (m
3/kg); xbleve  is the ground distance from the 
tank center;  Psv is the vapor pressure of the material (N/m
2); ∆Hc is the heat of combustion 
at boiling point  (J/kg); ∆HV is the heat of vaporization at boiling point (J/kg); Cp is the 
specific heat capacity (J/kg K); ∆T is the difference between flame temperature and 
ambient temperature (∆T = 1700 K); and Pvw is the water  partial vapor pressure (N/m
2). 
Once heat flux is estimated, the likelihood of fatalities is obtained from impact 
modeling.   
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3.4 Jet Fire  
Jet fire is ‘a turbulent diffusion flame’ resulted from combustion of a flammable 
material that is being  ejected from process equipment such as pipes, vessels, and flanges 
[44]. The main hazard involved is fire engulfment that can lead to equipment failure, and 
further escalate to another event (i.e. domino effect).  Jet fires can occur either vertically 
or horizontally; the last one has a higher probability of impingement on targets [44].  Based 
on that,  a model proposed by Johnson et al. [36] was implemented to predict the flame 
size of horizontal jets, and delimitate fatal zones. As assumed for flash fire,  people inside 
the flame area are subjected to fatal injuries while those outside does not suffer any adverse 
effect.   
In horizontal jet models, the flame shape is treated as a conical frustum. Since large 
uncertainties and complex calculations are involved with surface emissive power (SEP) 
estimation, fatal zones were limited by the flame geometry instead of using threshold 
values for SEP. To predict the flame geometry, several parameters must be addressed: (i) 
the combustion effective source diameter; (ii) the Mach number; (ii) exit velocity of the 
expanding jet, (ii) the Richardson Number; (iii) the length of frustum; (iv) flame position, 
X,Y, and Z ; and (v) minimum and maximum flame diameters. All correlations are 
available in literature [36] and listed in Table 8.  
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Table 8: Correlations for jet fire parameters 
Parameter Equation 
Temperature of 
expanding jet   Tj = T0 x (
Pa
P0
)
k−1
k
 (3.26) 
Exit velocity of the jet   uj = Mj x √k x R x Tj/wg (3.27) 
Combustion effective 
diameter   
Ds = dj√
ρj
ρa
 (3.28) 
Momentum flux  G =
πρjuj
2dj
2
4
 (3.29) 
Momentum flux at x-
direction                       Ωx = (
πρa
4G
)
1 2⁄
Lboua (3.30) 
Momentum flux at z-
direction                       Ωz = (
πρa
4G
)
1 2⁄
Lbowa (3.31) 
Richardson Number ε = (
πρag
4G
)
1 3⁄
Lbo (3.32) 
X-position 
X
Lbo
= f(ε)[1 + r(ε)Ωx] (3.33) 
Y-position 
Y
Lbo
= (1 + ε−1)−8.78[1 + 0.002εΩx] (3.34) 
Biggest diameter 
W2
Lbo
= −0.004 + 0.0396ε − Ωx(0.0094
+ 9.5x 10−7ε5) 
(3.35) 
Lifted- high  b = 0.141(Gρa)
1 2⁄   (3.36) 
Smallest diameter W1
b
= −0.18 + 0.081ε (3.37) 
Z-position  Z
X − b
= 0.178Ωz  (3.38) 
 
 
 
 Effects of jet fires on equipment were not accounted given the high complexity to 
predict the time to failure. When jet fire flames engulf equipment, extreme heat fluxes 
occur on the impinged surface. It makes extremely difficult to estimate with accuracy the 
heat transfer rate, which varies according to flammable material, flame size, and 
turbulence, and the flame region [45]. Several values have been proposed for specific fuels 
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(e.g. propane and natural gas). However, there is no common agreement. Furthermore, 
equipment may be insulated by a fire resistant material; wich may range the time to failure 
from seconds to hours, depending on maintenance conditions.  
 
3.5 Pool Fire  
Pool fire is defined as “a turbulent diffusion fire burning” of the vaporizing 
flammable material from a horizontal pool with low or none initial momentum [32]. 
Several scenarios may lead to a fire pool; it usually starts with a non-flashing liquid 
discharge of flammable chemical from process equipment followed by ignition.  If the 
liquid vaporizes while escaping (e.g. flashing liquids), only the remaining liquid will form 
a pool. Conditions for flashing discharges are discussed in section 2.1.3. Another 
important parameter to be considered during pool fire modeling is the geometry, even 
though pool fires are limited by surroundings (i.e. dikes), the occurrence of unconstrained 
pools is also possible in an “open, flat area” [30].    
There are many pool fire models available, differing in degree of complexity. In this 
methodology, correlations proposed by CCPS [30] were included. It gives reasonable 
results for pool fires on land within a short period. To initiate a pool fire model, following 
parameters should be addressed:  
 Mass released, m, in kilograms based on process conditions, 
 Heat of combustion of the material, ΔHc, in kJ/kg, 
 Specific heat capacity, Cp, in kJ/kg. K, and  
 The boiling point temperature, Tbp, in K.  
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From this information, the vertical rate of liquid level decrease (m/s) can be 
obtained as by  
ymax = 1.27 ∗ 10
−6
∆HC
∆H∗
 (3.39) 
where ∆𝐻∗ is the vaporization heat at boiling temperature.  
∆H∗ = ∆HV + Cp ∗ (Tbp − Ta) (3.40) 
From these expressions, the mass burning rate can be found.   
m" = ρymax (3.41) 
And the steady-state diameter of the pool can be estimated employing the 
simplified model: 
D = (
4ṁ
πṁ"
)
1/2
 (3.42) 
The flame height can be found: 
H = 42D(
m"
ρa√gD
)
0.61
 (3.43) 
And the burning time can be calculated: 
tb =
m
ṁ"A
, for equipment 
tb = 20 s, for employees 
(3.44) 
Finally, the heat flux at any point of interest away from the center of the fire can 
be estimated by following point source model: 
Is,k =
τa ∗ η ∗ m" ∗ ∆HC
16π(x/D)2
 (3.45) 
where 𝜂 is the combustion fraction (typically between 0.15 and 0.35), and  𝑥 is the distance 
from the center of the pool fire.  
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x2 = (
H
2
)
2
+ r2 (3.46) 
Unlike a fireball or flash fire, pool fires can last longer than just a few seconds, 
causing damage due prolonged exposure. Thus, the burning time is required to scale the 
amount of heat dosage at any point from a pool fire. Subsequently, burning time and heat 
flux are fed into a probit function (see section 3.6). 
 
3.6 Impact Modeling  
The next step of proposed methodology is to assess the consequences of incidents 
outcomes mentioned above on workers and structures by employing impact models. It is 
known that overpressures, radiation levels, and toxic concentrations may cause damage 
according to the exposure levels, however, mathematical expressions are required to 
predict impacts and further calculate related risks. Dose-response curves are widely used, 
in combination with a probit equations, to assess a single-exposure effect [30]. 
Probit functions represent the linearization of a dose-response curve following a 
normal distribution. Once probit coefficients are correctly defined, probit variables can be 
obtained with any dosage and then converted to probability values. Although dose-
response curves are usually employed in toxicology studies, this method can also be 
applied to predict the effects of any single exposure event, such as explosion overpressures 
or heat radiations from fire incidents. 
Probit functions are usually in the form Y = k1 + k2lnV, where Y represents the 
probit value, and parameters k1 and k2 are obtained from best-fitting response data to 
dosage data. V is the causative factor whose definition changes according to associated 
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hazard. All probit functions included are summarized in table 10.  Given the high 
complexity of assessing structural failure due to heat radiation, there is a limited (if any) 
number of models available. Consequently, it was not included in the model. Additionally, 
coefficients for common toxic chemicals are also listed in table 10. For toxic effects 
estimation, the time of exposure must be accounted and may vary according to dispersion 
model applied (e.g. 10 minutes for GPM).  
 
 
 
Table 9: Probit correlations for different types of exposure [31] 
Type of injury Probit function 
Deaths from heat radiation Y = −14.9 + 2.56 ln(
tIs
4 3⁄
104
) (3.47) 
Deaths from lung hemorrhage 
(overpressure) 
Y = −77.1 + 6.91 ln(Ps) (3.48) 
Deaths from impact (overpressure) Y = −46.1 + 4.82 ln(is) (3.49) 
Structural damage (overpressure) Y = −23.8 + 2.92 ln(Ps) (3.50) 
Deaths from ammonia release Y = −35.9 + 1.85 ln (∑C2t) (3.51) 
Deaths from chlorine releases Y = −8.29 + 0.92 ln (∑C2t) (3.52) 
 
 
 
where time of exposure (t) is defined in seconds, heat flux (Is) is define in W/s, peak 
overpressure (Ps) is defined in pascals, impact (is) is defined in Ns/m
2, and concentrations 
(C) in ppm.  
Once variable Y is known, it is converted to a probability of response by: 
𝑃 = 50 [1 +
𝑌 − 5
|𝑌 − 5|
erf (
|𝑌 − 5|
√2
)] (3.53) 
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where erf is the error function. This formulation is used to estimate the probability of a 
fatal incident and structural damage, which are fundamental to construct risk maps.  
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4. QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT  
 
This section describes the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) method developed 
for the layout optimization and facility siting. QRA is a probabilistic technique employed 
to estimate the risk from a particular process equipment or process unit [30]. Its aim is to 
support designers during layout modifications of existing or design of new facilities. 
Particular attention is given to on-site placement of high occupancy buildings such as 
control rooms or administrative buildings; however, this methodology can also be 
extended to far-field effects, helping decision makers in land use planning when combined 
with geographic information systems (GIS). Additionally, it provides a screening tool for 
possible events with major impacts, which should be further analyzed by more detailed 
techniques (e.g. CFD modeling) to account site specificities such as the degree of 
confinement or congestion, and geometry details. 
This research provides a methodology to estimate overall risks from different 
possible undesirable incidents inside a chemical plant and a computer program has been 
developed. The program is able to assess the frequency of each outcome and its potential 
to cause deaths and structural damage given a set of equipment defined by the user.  Then, 
for each set, individual risk curves are combined to obtain the overall risk. The results are 
then expressed as a plot of structural damage risk and individual risks varying with 
distances.  
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4.1 Overview of the Methodology  
The proposed methodology starts with segregating all process equipment in 
different modules or process units with predefined locations. Then, a description of each 
unit or equipment is included specifying the module size (width and length), list of 
equipment and chemicals, process conditions, and  the number of “virtual leak locations” 
[28].  
The second step is to identify hazardous scenarios that either affect building 
occupants or escalate to another event. This analysis is conducted for each module 
separately. As discussed in Section 3, specific outcomes of concern are those involving 
fire, explosion, and toxic releases that may impact employees, buildings and equipment 
inside chemical plants. Hazards from runaway reactions, dust, and cryogenic materials are 
not considered, but it can be included in the model.  Figure 6 illustrates the list of all 
possible undesired outcomes included given the process conditions and the chemicals 
involved. If a flammable material is present, then jet fires, flash fires, VCE, BLEVE 
followed by fireball, and pool fire may be possible depending of the process conditions. 
However, a BLEVE can also take place in case a pressurized tank storing non-flammable 
material catastrophically fails.     
Once all hazardous events are known, the potential damage can be assessed and 
risks curves can be calculated for each module. Alghamdi [28] and Ramirez et. al.[29] 
proposed similar methodologies to calculate explosion risks from VCEs. Following the 
same direction, an approach was used to extend to other types of outcomes (see Figure 7). 
Given a specific equipment, hole leak sizes and their  frequency of occurrence are obtained 
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from generic data [46, 47].  Then, the equipment type, hole size, and leak location are 
selected randomly by Monte Carlo simulation to calculate the discharge rate (see section 
2.1), which is applied to estimate ignition probabilities (see section 2.3). Therefore, the 
frequency of each fire scenario is obtained combining leak frequency and ignition 
probabilities. 
At the same time consequence modeling is performed. For scenarios that are not 
influenced by atmospheric conditions (e.g. BLEVE, jet fires, and pool fires), the affected 
area is estimated following equations listed in Section 3. Otherwise, a dispersion model 
(GPM or Britter and Mcquaid model) needs to be first employed to estimate gas cloud 
volumes, flammability zones and concentration isocontours using the release rate and leak 
location as well as randomly selected atmospheric conditions. Then, to predict damage 
from VCEs, the calculated cloud volume and the distances from the cloud center are 
included into the TNO multi-energy model to predict peak overpressures and positive 
impulses.  As stated in Section 3, probit functions are applied to obtain the likelihood of 
fatalities and/or structural damage in case of VCEs, BLEVEs, pool fires, and toxic 
releases. For flash fires and jet fires, the flammability zone was considered as a fatal 
region- where the probability of fatality is equal to one.  This process is repeated according 
to the number of iterations defined by the user. In each iteration, the risk curves are 
calculated and stored. Once all iterations are completed, the stored risk curves are used to 
obtain the risk distributions at particular points. The methodology has been implemented 
by developing a script program in Matlab. The program has been designed to calculate 
overall risk contours to support decision maker during the design phase. Even though it 
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does not take into account the effectiveness of mitigation systems, it can still be applied 
as a screening tool for comparison of potential layouts. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Possible outcomes scenarios based on process conditions (modified from [34])
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Figure 7: Methodology used for current research explaining how consequence model and frequency estimation are combined to estimate 
the risk of each outcome scenario
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4.1.1 Scenario Frequencies  
For this work, it is proposed to classify initiating events into two categories: 
continuous and catastrophic releases. Continuous releases are caused by the presence of 
holes in the process equipment resulting in small release rates while catastrophic events 
occur from equipment rupture leading to the discharge of the total containment within a 
short time. The primary objective of this distinction is to make sure that the worst-case 
scenario has been considered, and the risk has not been underestimated. The failure 
frequency of each initiating event can be obtained from generic data [46, 47]. Table 10 
shows the release rates for steel process pipes with different diameters according to the 
initiating event.  
Following the bowtie graphs showed in Section 3 (Fig.  3 and Fig. 4), the frequencies of 
each fire scenarios can be obtained combining initiating event frequencies and ignition 
probabilities (Table 12).  
 
 
 
Table 10: Frequency release for steel process pipe [18] 
Initiate 
Event 
Hole diameter 
range (mm) 
Pipeline diameter 
50 mm 150mm 450 mm 
Continuous 
1 to 3 5.5 E-05 2.6 E-05 2.3E-05 
3 to 10 1.8E-05 8.5E-06 7.5E-06 
10 to 50 7.0E-06 2.7E-06 2.4E-06 
50 to 150 0.0E-06 6.0E-06 3.6E-07 
>150 0.0E-06 0.0E-06 1.7E-07 
Catastrophic  7.0E-06 6.0E-06 1.7E-07 
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Table 11: Estimation of initiating events probability 
Possible 
Scenario 
Equation 
BLEVE PBLEVE = Pimm.ing (4.1) 
Jet Fire PJF = Pimm.ing. Pjet.dir (4.2) 
VCE  PVCE = (1 − Pimm.ing). Pdel.ign. Pexp |del.ign (4.3) 
Flash Fire/  
Pool Fire  
Pff/Pf = (1 − Pimm.ing). Pdel.ign. (1 − Pexp |del.ign) (4.4) 
Environmental 
Release 
PER = (1 − Pimm.ing). (1 − Pdel.ign) (4.5) 
 
 
 
where  Pimm.ign, Pdel.ign, and Pexp |del.ign refer to the ignition probabilities for immediate 
ignition, delayed ignition, and explosion given a delayed ignition, respectively; and Pjet.dir 
represents the probability of jet fire at certain direction. 
 
4.1.2 Risk Estimation  
The risk calculated in this methodology takes into account the frequency of 
initiating events, and the probability of occurrence multiplied by the damage likelihood of 
all possible outcomes that might occur in a specific module. The risk is evaluated for each 
scenario separately and further combined.  
ri,j = Fn ∗ Pti,j (4.6) 
where 
Pti,j = 1 −∏(1 − Pk ∗ Pdamagek,i,j)
K
k=1
 (4.7) 
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Here 𝑘 represents each possible outcome; 𝑖 and 𝑗 are the Cartesian coordinates; Pk 
is the likelihood of scenario k; Pdamagek,i,j is the probability that event k causes damage 
at coordinates (i, j); and F is the frequency of each initiating event.  
Equation (4.6) is used to estimate both fatality risks and structural damage risks. 
The frequencies of each scenario and its respective damage probability have already been 
discussed.  
 
4.1.3 Monte Carlo Simulation  
Since risk is a function of consequence and frequency, it is highly influenced by 
uncertain parameters such as failure rate, atmospheric conditions, release size, etc [29]. 
Large uncertain values for risk play an important role and may influence decision makers. 
Based on that, Monte Carlo simulation is conducted to propagate the uncertainties of each 
variable and calculate the range for the risk at a particular distance, instead of just point 
values. Each uncertain parameter was treat as a stochastic variable represented by 
probability distributions functions. For sake of simplicity, variations pertaining only to 
leak locations, leak source, hole size, release height, atmospheric stability, and wind speed 
and directions were included in the code. Constant values were assumed of the other 
factors. 
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4.1.4  Number of Leak Locations 
The number of leak locations is defined by the user and it starts by specifying the 
length and width of the module as well as the distance between each element in the x and 
y directions. Then, the module area is divided in equally distributed grid points, which 
will be treated by the program as leak sources (see Figure 8). If the number of leak location 
is set to 1, then all releases are modeled as coming from the center point of the process 
module.  Once the number of elements is defined, the leak position is selected randomly. 
It should be noted that it is role of the user to decide the optimum number of leak points 
which varies with module size and number equipment interconnections [28].  It is 
suggested as a rule of thumb to use grid size between 1 m2 to 4 m2 when considering the 
number of elements [28].   
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Different numbers of leak points according to the user specifications 
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4.2 Safety Distances to Prevent Domino Effect 
Domino effect has been a major contributing factor for the severity of various 
industrial accidents. Although several works have been published to quantitatively assess  
domino effects [48-50], there is still divergent opinions among researchers regarding the 
proper definition of this term [51]. According to CCPS [30],  the domino effect is “an 
incident which starts in one item and may affect nearby items by thermal, blast or fragment 
impact, causing an increase in consequence severity or in failure frequencies.” 
Thus, as suggested by Cozzani et al. [52], three elements must be in place in order 
to originate a domino effect: 
i) The primary accident scenario, which leads to a domino effect;  
ii)  The escalation vector, which acts on secondary targets propagating the 
domino effect; and  
iii)  Secondary events due to the escalation vector, which may affect different 
plant units.   
It should be clear that primary accidents alone do not characterize domino effects: 
an escalation event takes places if the severity of secondary scenarios is higher in respect 
to that of the initiating event [52].Thus, to assess the probability of escalation, it is crucial 
to first identify all primary scenarios with potential to damage secondary targets and 
further analyzes the consequences of secondary events. Modeling all possible domino 
scenarios is not a simple task and may be time-consuming since the number of secondary 
events grows exponentially as more equipment are added. Therefore, the complexity of 
domino effect assessment  may vary according to the context and purpose of the analysis 
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[51]. A simple approach to address domino effect is to determine  “inherent safe 
distances”, which are the minimum separation distances between equipment necessary to 
prevent escalation events, early in the design stage [53]. 
 Safe distances are based on threshold values that describe “the minimum intensity 
of primary scenarios able to trigger escalation”[26]. Even though those values can be 
adequately applied, there is still a lack of agreement among researchers and regulatory 
agencies regarding minimum values able to cause damage to equipment [26]. The large 
uncertainty in threshold values, which may differ in orders of magnitude, is related to the 
complexity of the escalation phenomena and depends on the characteristics of primary 
events, escalation vectors, and target units.  
There are three main escalation vectors with potential to cause a domino effect: 
heat radiation or flame impingement, overpressure, and fragment projection [52]. Primary 
scenarios that have the potential to trigger those escalations vectors are listed in Table 12. 
Toxic release is not included since it does not lead to loss of containment (LOC) or any 
structural damage. In this research, effects of fragment projection are not included given 
the inaccuracy of current models. Additionally, safe distances were estimated based on 
threshold values recommended by Cozzani et al.[52], which depends mainly on primary 
scenarios.  
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Table 12: Escalation vector resulted from different primary events [52] 
Primary event Escalation Vector 
Pool Fire Radiation, fire impingement 
Jet Fire Radiation, fire impingement 
Fireball Radiation, fire impingement 
Flash Fire Fire impingement 
BLEVE Fragment projection, overpressure 
VCE Overpressure, fire impingement 
 
 
 
Due to their short duration, flash fires are unlikely to cause damage to others 
equipment. However, if a potential source of fuels such as floating roof tanks storing 
flammable vapors is presented, the flammability zone extension should be considered as 
minimum distance [52]. Escalation due to fireball is not credible either for both 
atmospheric and pressurized tanks, unless fire directly contacts a nearby unit [53].  
Therefore, safety distances are delimited by the fireball radius.   
In the case of jet fires, the safety distance depends on the maximum flame length 
and the thermal radiation emitted. If equipment is engulfed by a fire  or it is the proximity 
of a  jet flame, the  time to failure will depend on the type of equipment: atmospheric 
vessels can stand more than 15 min when located within 50m from the flame envelope 
while pressurized vessels this  may stand up to 13 min before it fails [26]. However, since 
pressurized vessels are usually protected by both passive and active protective devices, an 
escalation event is not credible for long distances (greater than 25m) from the flame 
envelope [52].  
For pool fires, LOC is considered if equipment is exposed to a certain heat 
radiation during a minimum exposure time; for this work, atmospheric vessels at distances 
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lower than 50m from pool limits will lead to escalation if the exposure time is greater than 
15min [52, 54]. A conservative safety distance (20 m) is assumed for pressurized tanks.   
For scenarios involving overpressure (e.g. BLEVE and VCE), threshold values for 
peak overpressure are applied to estimate the safe distances. All relations mentioned 
above, are summarized in Table 13. Finding inherently safe distances is the last stage of 
the QRA for this research and it includes all equipment with potential to cause primary 
accidents as well as all units that might be targeted. After deciding which unit or set of 
units (module) are likely to cause initiating events, all steps mentioned in Section 4.1 are 
followed to estimate the frequency (per year) of escalation events.  However, in this 
particular case, escalation criterion (see Table 13) are employed instead of probit 
functions; thus, probability of having a propagation (Pd) is equal to 1 if the physical effects 
affecting a secondary unit exceeds the threshold values, otherwise Pd is equal to 0. Like 
risk maps, distributions for the risk of domino effect are obtained at specific position; then, 
decision makers may establish their criteria for safety distances. Once risk maps and safety 
distances are defined, we move forward for the layout optimization, which is described in 
the following chapter.  
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Table 13: Damage thresholds  and safety distances to prevent escalation (adapted from [26]) 
Scenario 
Escalation 
vector 
Modality Target unit 
Escalation 
criteria 
Safety 
Distance 
Flash fire Heat 
radiation 
Fire 
impingement 
All Escalation 
unlikely 
- 
Fireball Heat 
radiation 
Flame 
engulfment 
Atmospheric I>100 
kW/m2 
Maximum 
flame 
distance 
   Pressurized Escalation 
unlikely 
- 
Jet fire  Heat 
radiation 
Fire 
impingement 
All Flame 
envelope 
Maximum 
flame 
distance 
Pool fire  Heat 
radiation 
Flame 
engulfment 
All Flame 
envelope 
Maximum 
flame 
distance 
VCE and 
BLEVE 
Overpressure Blast wave 
interaction 
Atmospheric P>22 kPa Respective 
scaled 
distance 
   Pressurized P>20 kPa Respective 
scaled 
distance 
   Elongated 
(toxic ) 
P>20 kPa Respective 
scaled 
distance 
   Elongated 
(flammable) 
P>31 kPa Respective 
scaled 
distance 
 
Here I represents the heat flux, and P is the peak overpressure.  
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5. LAYOUT OPTIMIZATION FORMULATION  
 
In this chapter the steps proposed to solve the layout optimization problem are 
presented. Once all risk mapping and safety distances are established (Chapter 4), a 
mathematical formulation using Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) is applied to 
find the location of inhabited buildings and new equipment in order to minimize the total 
capital cost associated with structural damage risk, fatality risk,  pipeline interconnection, 
and  protective devices.  Individual risk criteria were set as an additional constraint for 
high occupancy buildings, meaning that the overall risk for buildings such as control room 
or lab may not exceed this criterion. In the end, the final layout will be obtained based on 
minimal cost and the risk acceptance criteria (RAC).  
 
5.1 General Description  
Layout optimization can be formulated in  two distinct manners:  continuous plane 
and grid-based methods [55]. In the continuous plane method, different hazardous 
scenarios have been represented by non-linear equations which have been incorporated 
into the layout formulation [7, 21, 23]. The problem with this approach is that achieving 
global minimum becomes more challenging as the number of non-linear equations 
increases [7]. For grid-based methods, non-linear equations can be avoided and the 
optimal result is obtained more easily if the problem is feasible. In this case, each facility 
can either occupy one single grid with fixed size or multiple grids. In this study, both 
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assumptions are possible however, if multiple grids are occupied by at least one facility, 
additional constraints must be included.  
As proposed by Jung et al.[9], the formulation starts dividing the plant area into a 
specific number of grids (n) with different coordinates, xk and y𝑘. Then, each module (set 
of processing equipment) must be placed according to the recommendations provided by 
the standards such as API 752 and good engineering practices.  Finally, new facilities 
(mainly inhabited buildings and storage tanks) are to be allocated in the remaining grids 
based on minimal costs and additional constraints. The optimization problem is solved by 
using CPLEX with GAMS software environment. The following sections provide the 
necessary information and constraints implemented in the model. 
 
5.2 Sets, Scalars, and Parameters 
All sets, scalars, and parameters used in the formulation are described as follows: 
𝒆 ∈ 𝑬  set of possible escalation vectors (overpressure and fire 
impingement)  
𝒇 ∈ 𝑭  set of all facilities to be allocated 
𝒈 ∈ 𝑮  set of fixed modules  
𝒊 ∈ 𝑰  set of units to be allocated 
𝒋 ∈ 𝑱  set of high occupancy buildings to be allocated 
𝒌 ∈ 𝑲   set of grids to be included in the plant site  
𝐱𝐤  the x-position of each grid  
𝐲𝐤  the y-position of each grid   
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𝐑𝐃𝐤,𝐦  the rectilinear distance of between the k-th grid and the m-th fixed 
module 
𝐃𝐦,𝐟  the minimum separation distances between units  
𝐒𝐃𝐀,𝐁,𝐞  the minimum distance between units A and B to prevent escalation 
event e 
𝐔𝐏𝐟,𝐦 the interconnection cost between item f and m 
𝐌𝐂𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐩,𝐞 the cost of mitigation system p to protect from escalation vector e 
RAC  the risk acceptance criteria  
M  a big M scalar for non-overlap constraints  
𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐧𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐦,𝐣  the binary parameter that indicates interconnection between module 
m and unit j 
𝐍𝐏𝐟  the expected number of workers at a facility f 
𝐒𝐑𝐤  the risk of structural damage at a particular grid  
𝐅𝐑𝐤  the risk of fatality at a particular grid 
 𝐅𝐂𝐟  the facility cost  
 
5.3 Variables 
The following variables are applied in this formulation: 
𝐱𝐟 final values for x positions of each facility, f 
𝐲𝐟  final values for y positions of each facility, f  
𝐁𝐟,𝐤  non-overlapping binary variable  
Sep1 to Sep4 binary variables for separation distances constraints  
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𝐄𝟏𝐀,𝐁,𝐞, 𝐄𝟐𝐀,𝐁,𝐞 binary variables for escalation zones constraints  
𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐭𝐃𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞𝐩,𝐛,𝐞 binary variable that defines the assignment of passive mitigation 
systems to prevent escalation to a unit B (1 if protective device P 
is assigned to unit B, 0 otherwise) 
 
5.4 Constraints  
All constraints used in the formulation are detailed in the following sections.   
5.4.1 Non-overlapping Constraints  
A binary variable Bf,k was implemented as suggested by Georgiadis and 
Macchietto [18] to  ensure that all f facilities are allocated in different grids.  
Bf,k = {
1, if facility f is placed at grid n
0, otherwise
    ,     ∀f ∈ F, ∀k ∈ L 
∑Bf,k
L
k=1
= 1, ∀f ∈ F (5.1) 
∑Bf,k
F
f=1
= 1, ∀k ∈ K (5.2) 
The locations of pre-defined modules are fixed as follows:  
Bg,l = 1, ∀g ∈ G, ∀l ∈ 𝐿 (5.3) 
 
5.4.2  Facility Boundary Constraints 
The facility boundary constraints operate assuring that all midpoints (xf and yf) do 
not assume any value different from the grid coordinates (xk and yk).  
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−M(1 − Bf,k) ≤ xk − xf ≤ M(1 − Bf,k) (5.437) 
−M(1 − Bf,k) ≤ yk − yf ≤ M(1 − Bf,k) (5.5) 
Once all midpoints are known, the distances between new facilities and fixed 
modules can be obtained. This procedure starts by estimating and storing rectilinear 
distances from an individual grid to fixed modules (RDk,m ). Then,  as a facility is being 
allocated to a particular grid, it will be assigned to its respective 𝑅Dk,m. Using rectilinear 
distances rather than Euclidean distances approaches the piping costs estimation to the 
real industrial application [19].  
 
5.4.3  Separation Distances Constraints   
The minimum separation distance constraints determine how far away one facility 
should be from another. It can be applied in addition to Equation (5.2) to prevent overlaps 
in case a facility occupies multiple grids. Moreover it is also employed when safe distances 
should be maintained between process equipment and inhabited building. The general 
expression for minimum separation distances is given by   
|xm − 𝑥f|  + |𝑦m − 𝑦f| ≥ Dm,f (5.6) 
where subscript m refers to the subset of new facilities. This general expression can be 
rewritten by using Big-M method.  
(xm − 𝑥f)  + (ym − yf) ≥ Dm,f. Sep1m,f −M(1 − Sep1m,f) (5.7) 
(xm − xf) − (ym − yf) ≥ Dm,f. Sep2m,f −M(1 − Sep2m,f) (5.8) 
−(xm − xf)  + (ym − yf) ≥ Dm,f. Sep3m,f −M(1 − Sep3m,f) (5.9) 
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−(xm − xf) − (ym − yf) ≥ Dm,f. Sep4m,f −M(1 − Sep4m,f) (5.10) 
Sep1m,f + Sep2m,f + Sep3m,f + Sep4m,f ≥ 1 (5.11) 
Here, Dmf represents the minimum separation distance between m-th and f-th 
facilities; Sep1m,f to Sep4m,f are binary variables; and M is the proper upper bound.  
 
5.5 Inherently Safety Zones and Mitigation Systems Constraints  
The main purpose of including safety zones is to prevent domino effects. In 
Chapter 4, a methodology was presented to calculate inherently safe distances between 
process equipment.  These distances are defined depending on the risk tolerance and, once 
estimated, they determine how far new process equipment should be from other new 
equipment and fixed modules. Two safety zones are defined: one to prevent escalation 
from overpressure and another to protect from fire impingement (see Figure 9). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Visual representation of inherently safety zones (modified from [24]) 
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Each hypothetical zone should not englobe any possible targeted unit, unless this 
unit is equipped with protective devices. To ensure that all safety distances are maintained, 
a set of constraints suggested by Hans et al. [24]  were used.  
(xA − xB)  + M(E1A,B,e + E2A,B,e) ≥ SDA,B,e (5.12) 
(xA − xB)  + M(1 − E1A,B,e + E2A,B,e) ≥ SDA,B,e (5.13) 
(yA − yB)  + M(1 + E1A,B,e − E2A,B,e) ≥ SDA,B,e (5.14) 
(yA − yB)  + M(2 − E1A,B,e − E2A,B,e) ≥ SDA,B,e (5.15) 
where subscripts A refers to the units with potential to cause initiating events; subscript B 
refers to possible targeted units; SDA,B,e represents the inherently safety distance given a 
specific escalation vector; and E1A,B,e and  E2A,B,e  are binary variables. This set of 
constraints is applied separately for each escalation zone individually, represented by 
subscript e. 
When a targeted unit is protected by mitigation systems, the likelihood of 
escalation events is reduced [50]. Consequently, minimum separation distances are 
reduced by a factor (RFp,e) depending on the protective device configuration employed. 
Therefore, the final safety distances are calculated as follows.  
SDA,B,e = SDA,B,e
initial (1 −∑RFp,e. ProtDevicep,b,e
𝑃
) (5.16) 
∑ ProtDevicep,b,e
𝑃
≤ 1, ∀b ∈ B, ∀e ∈ E   (5.17) 
Expression (5.17) limits one mitigation system configuration per unit, meaning 
that it can be either one protective device or a combination of multiples devices.  
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5.6 Risk Acceptance Criteria (RAC) 
Individual risk criterion was used as an additional constraint for high occupancy 
buildings, which means that the overall risk for facilities such as control room or lab may 
not exceed this specific limit. This RAC is subjected to the organization’s risk perceptions 
and risk attitudes (risk neutral, risk averse or risk seeking); however, the UK Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE) proposes a “tolerable criteria”  (10-3 per annum)  for employees 
working in harzadous areas [56]. Once RAC is defined, the following  constraint is 
applied.  
∑Bk,j. FatalRiskk
𝑘
≤ RAC, ∀j ∈ J (5.18) 
where j refers to inhabited buildings.   
 
5.7 Objective Function   
The objective function is a combination of total cost (TC) and total damage costs 
(TDC). The first term includes costs of interconnection between new facilities and fixed 
modules plus protective device configuration costs.  TC ($) is expressed as follows:  
TC =∑∑∑ RDm,k. Connectm,j. ICf,m. Bf,k
M
m=1
F
f=1
K
k=1
+∑∑∑ProtDevicep,b,e. MCostp,b,e
2
e=1
 
P
p=1
B
b=1
  
(5.19) 
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where Connectm,j is the parameter that indicates interconnection between item m and j; 
ICf,m is the interconnection cost; and MCostp,e is the purchase and maintenance cost of 
protective device configuration p in item b to prevent escalation e.  
In addition to TC, costs due to the potential loss of life and structural damage are 
also included.  
TDC =∑∑(SRk. FCf + FRk. NPf. Comp). Bf,k. 𝐿
F
f=1
K
k=1
  (5.20) 
where SRk and FRk are the structural damage and fatality risks at grid k, respectively; 
NPf is the expected number of worker nearby facility f; Comp is the compensation cost 
due to fatality; and L is the expected life time of the facility.  
The challenge here is to address economic value to human life; even though it is 
not possible to monetize one person’s life, this analysis is crucial to evaluate monetary 
losses due to fatalities resulted from LOC incidents. Based on the United States 
Department of Labor [57], a compensation cost of $1.000.000 per occupational death was 
used. Finally, the objective function contains the sum of costs defined in equations (5.19) 
and (5.20).  
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min 𝑧 =∑∑∑ RDm,k. Connectm,j. ICf,m. Bf,k
M
m=1
F
f=1
K
k=1
+∑∑∑ProtDevicep,b,e. MCostp,b,e
2
e=1
 
P
p=1
B
b=1
+ ∑∑(SRk. FCf + FRk. NPf. Comp). Bf,k. 𝐿
F
f=1
K
k=1
 
(5.21) 
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6. CASE STUDY  
 
The proposed methodology was applied to a case study taken from  CCPS [30] and 
Jung et al.[9] which is described in the following sections.  
 
6.1 Case Description  
This example case deals with a distillation column that separates hexane and 
heptane from a feed stream. It is assumed that there is single hazardous unit composed by 
a distillation tower, an accumulator, a steam reboilers, two pumps, one heat exchanger, 
three control valves, and steel pipes with three different diameters (0.10 m, 0.15 m, and 
0.50 m). Figure 10 shows the process flow diagram. The distillation column operates at 4 
barg and the temperature ranges from 130oC on top to 160oC at the bottom. The entire 
inventory of the mixture is 28,000 kg which is distributed among the reboiler and the 
column bottom (6,000 kg), column trays (10,000 kg) and accumulator drum (12,000kg).  
All process equipment and operating conditions are listed in Table 14. To generate 
releases scenarios, it is assumed that each equipment has the same likelihood of leaking. 
Thus, a discrete uniform distribution is applied in the program; the number of leak 
locations was set as 121 following the recommended grid size of 1 m2 [28]. The releases 
scenarios are shown in Table 15; it was assumed that all equipment can lead to both 
continuous and instantaneous release, depending on the failure mode. The failure data was 
taken from OGP [46] and HSE [47] and are shown in Appendix B.  
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Figure 10: Flow diagram of the distillation unit (modified from [30]) 
 
 
 
Table 14: List of process equipment and process conditions 
Equipment Type Count Pressure Temperature 
Process Vessel  3 4 Barg / 8 Barg* 130oC/180 oC* 
Valve 3 4 Barg 130oC 
Pump  2 4 Barg 130oC 
Heat Exchanger  1 4 Barg 130oC 
Steel pipe (0.50 ID) 10 8 Barg 180oC 
Steel pipe (0.15 ID) 15 4 Barg 130oC 
Steel pipe (0.10 ID)  25 4 Barg 130oC 
* Conditions at the steam reboiler 
 
 
 
If a catastrophic failure occurs, the entire containment is released within a short 
period. However, if a continuous release takes places, the maximum release time is set to 
be 10 minutes to account for the emergency response. The bowtie graphs are shown in 
Figure 4 and Figure 5. Five possible outcomes are considered: BLEVE, VCE, jet fire, flash 
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fire and pool fire. The toxicity effect is negligible since the unit does not process any toxic 
chemical. Because the vapors of both hexane and heptane are heavier than the air, the 
dense gas dispersion model was used.   
 
 
 
Table 15: List of release scenarios 
No Scenario 
1 Release from 100 mm steel pipes 
2 Release from 150 mm steel pipes 
3 Release from 500 mm steel pipes 
4 Release from 150 mm valves 
5 Release from 150 mm  Hexane pump 
6 Release from 150 mm  Heptane pump 
7 Release from Column (process vessel) 
8 Release from Accumulator (process vessel) 
9 Release from Steam Reboiler (process vessel) 
10 Release from Heat Exchange (process vessel) 
 
 
 
Eight wind directions are included and their respective probabilities are listed in 
Table 16 [30]. All stability classes (A-F) were considered and the wind speed was 
randomly selected between 1 to 6 m/s. A uniform distribution was addressed to the release 
height ranging from 0 m (ground source) to 20 m (unit height). 
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Table 16: Wind directions and their respective probabilities for the plant site  
Slice Direction Angular degree (deg) Probability 
1 N 0 0.1 
2 NE 45 0.1 
3 E 90 0.1 
4 SE 135 0.1 
5 S 180 0.15 
6 SW 225 0.2 
7 W 270 0.15 
8 NW 315 0.1 
 
 
 
6.1.1 Layout Information 
For the layout study, information was taken from Jung et al. [9]. A flat area of 100 
m in the east direction and 100 m in the north direction is considered and the expected 
lifetime of the processing plant is 50 years. The separation unit is located in the middle 
point (50, 50) and its dimension is 20m x 20m. There are seven facilities to be allocated, 
the main control room, an office building, a maintenance building, three storage tanks and 
one utility. Table 17 lists all the parameters for each unit.  
Common industrial safety distances between inhabited buildings and hazardous 
units were applied (see Table 18). These constraints were in the form of Equations (5.12) 
to (5.15).  
 
 
 
 
 77 
 
Table 17: Description of facilities inside the plant 
No Unit 
Dimension 
(m x m) 
People 
Nearby 
Equipment 
Cost ($) 
Interconnection 
cost ($/m/year) 
1 Control room  10 x 10 10 1,000,000 10 
2 Office 10 x 10 200 300,000 0.1 
3 Maintenance 
Building 
10 x 10 10 200,000 2 
4 Small storage tank 1 10 x 10 1 100,000 100 
5 Small storage tank 2 10 x 10 1 100,000 100 
6 Large Storage Tank 10 x 10 - 150,000 1000 
7 Utility  10 x10 5 500,000 50 
8 Distillation unit  20 x 20 - - - 
 
 
 
Table 18: Minimum separation distances (from AIChE [1]) 
Unit  Small storage tanks 
(U4,U5) 
Large 
Tank (U6) 
Utility 
(U7) 
Distillation 
Unit 
Control room (U1) 30 m 76 m 30 m 50 m 
Office (U2) 15 m 76 m 30 m 50 m 
Maintenance bdg  (U3) 15 m 76 m 30 m 50 m 
  
 
 
The costs of including fire insulation, fire and blast resistance wall and each 
reduction factor are listed in Table 19. The decision whether included a mitigation system 
or not is applicable to all storage tanks given their potential for secondary incidents.  
 
 
 
Table 19: Parameters for protective devices (adapted from [58]) 
Equipment 
Protective device costs 
Fire Insulation  Fire Wall Barricade 
Small Storage Tanks  2,000 $ 15,000 $ 30,000 $ 
Large Storage Tank 3,000 $ 20,000 $ 60,000 $ 
Reduction Factor  0.5 0.9 0.9 
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6.2  Results and Discussion  
6.2.1 Quantitative Risk Assessment 
Risk maps for the distillation unit were calculated following the proposed 
stochastic approach and are shown in Figure 11 .  A set of 10,000 combinations of different 
random variables was generated; each stochastic variable was selected with respect to its 
distribution function. Consequently, the outcome values for risk is a distribution rather 
than single values.  From Figure 11, it should be noticed that, at a particular point, risk 
may assume values with different orders of magnitude depending on the intensity and 
frequency of a specific scenario. Moreover, it is observed higher values for fatality risks 
when compared to damage structure risk. This mainly results from the omission of flash 
fire effects on buildings and equipment. Given the short duration, flash fires usually do  
not affect nearby units unless it may act as a fuel source such as floating roof tank. 
However, when it comes to employee vulnerability, flash fires are considered fatal and 
flammability zones can be extensive in  the case of catastrophic failures.  
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Figure 11: Risk maps for the distillation unit. 
 
 
 
To better understand the variation of risk values at certain points, risk curves can 
be obtained. Figure 12 shows the risk curves at the center line of the facility, moving 
towards the east. At each point, the final outcome ranges from 1x10-15 to 1x10-4 (per year). 
A challenging task is to decide which values should be applied during the design phase; 
higher risks requires larger areas to be occupied, increasing layout costs; in contrast, lower 
risk reduces layout costs but it might underestimate the overall risk resulting hazardous 
options. This decision with the organization risk perception and risk attitudes and it is the 
role of designers to identify the values that best represent it.  For a conservative approach, 
the 95th percentile curve can be applied at the same time that, for a risk-neutral perspective, 
the mean values curve seems to be fittable.  
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Figure 12: Risk curves at the facility center line in the east direction 
 
 
 
Another application for this program is to investigate risk distributions at specific 
points of interest, which is useful during building vulnerability assessment posterior the 
layout configuration is defined.  
Figure 13 shows boxplots for fatality and structural damage risks at 10m, 50m, and 
80m from the distillation unit. The reduction of median values as well as lower and upper 
quartiles with distance confirms the statement that lower risk values are expected as we 
move away from the unit.  Additionally, at longer distances, risk distributions tend to get 
wider characterizing a higher variability. A large number of outliers (represented by red 
points) might be related to catastrophic scenarios, which result in higher risk values. 
Finally, a non-symmetric shape is observed given the graph is expressed on log-scale. 
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Thus, a next step would be to investigate which non-symmetric distribution (e.g. Weibull, 
lognormal, exponential) better fits the data. Since is not the scope of this work to validate 
risk curves, this analysis was not performed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Boxplots of risk values at 10m, 50m and 80m from the distillation unit in the east 
direction 
 
 
 
Safety distances to prevent domino effect can also be determined following the 
proposed methodology. For this particular example, all atmospheric tanks may be 
subjected to escalation and minimal distances should be kept between tanks and the 
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distillation unit. Using damage thresholds for atmospheric tanks (Table 13), frequencies 
of domino effect are calculated and the distances are chosen based on the risk acceptance 
criteria. Figure 14 presents two domino effect frequency profiles considering escalation 
due to overpressure (left side) and fire impingement (right side).  Information regarding 
domino effect frequencies as we move far from the unit center was extracted and listed in 
Table 20. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Domino effect frequencies profiles (mean values) according to the distances from the 
distillation module for storage tanks as target units 
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Table 20: Distances from the distillation module and its respective frequency of secondary 
events for a storage tank 
Frequency of escalation 
(per year) 
Distance from the distillation unit (m) 
Overpressure Fire Impingement 
1 x10-5 63 16 
1x10-6 160 93 
1x 10-7 187 - 
 
 
 
As expected, the occurrence of secondary events reduces as we move far from the 
distillation module. It is also observed that higher distances are necessary to protect 
atmospheric tanks from overpressure. For example, if an atmospheric tank is located 63 
m away from the distillation unit, one escalation event due to overpressure is likely to 
occur in 100,000 years; for fire impingement scenarios, this distance is reduced to 16 m. 
The same procedure was repeated for the largest storage tank and the information is 
presented in Table 21. Since BLEVE or VCE are not expected to occur in the case of 
releases from atmosphere tanks, only fire impingement was considered. It is important to 
notice that those results are applicable for tanks without containment (e.g. dikes); if the 
tank is surrounded by a barrier that prevents the liquid from spreading after spillage, the 
containment length should be used as a safety distance.  
 
 
 
Table 21: Distances from the large storage tank and its respective frequency of secondary events 
for storage tank 
Frequency of escalation 
(per year) 
Distance from the distillation unit (m)  
1 x10-4 30 
1x10-5 84 
1x 10-6 100 
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Once safety distances and risk maps are obtained, the next is step is to perform a 
layout optimization.  
 
6.2.2 Layout Optimization 
Including all information mentioned in Section 6.2.2, the MILP model was solved 
using CPLEX in GAMS software. Four parameters were varied at two levels (risk maps: 
mean values and 95th percentile; safe distances from the distillation unit; safe distances 
from each tank; and risk acceptance criteria (RAC): 10-3 and 10-5 fatality per year. Figure 
15 shows the resulting layouts for mean risk values; no difference was observed varying 
RAC. This behavior is not repeated when the 95th percentile is applied (see Figure 16). 
Each condition (a-d) refers to a specific combination of safe distances as listed in Table 
22. 
 
 
 
Table 22: Safe distances applied during layout optimization 
Condition 
Safe distance from the unit (m) Safe distance from 
tanks (m) Overpressure Fire 
(a) 63 16 30 
(b) 63 16 84 
(c) 160 93 30 
(d) 160 93 84 
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Figure 15: Resulting layouts for mean values of risk maps; each condition (a-d) 
corresponds to different safe distances combination 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Resulting layouts for the 95th percentile of risk values; each condition (a-d) 
corresponds to different safe distances combination 
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Figure 16: Continued 
In the final results, the distillation unit is fixed in the middle point (50, 50) while 
all the others have their location changed according to the condition applied. Even though 
several layout options were obtained, there is a trend towards placing the equipment by its 
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type. For example, high occupancy buildings (units #1, #2 and #3) are fixed in regions 
with low wind probabilities and, consequently, lower risks. Units #2 and #3 are the most 
distant from distillation module due to their high number of occupants.  Moreover, small 
storage tanks are in general placed nearby the distillation module and protective devices 
are necessary to avoid escalation. The largest tank is placed in opposite direction of 
occupied buildings to respect the minimal safe distance. Finally, unit 7 is positioned close 
to the facility border and, in case of mean risk values, its final location is invariant. 
Nevertheless, for the case of 95th percentile, unit 7 assumes two distinct locations 
according to the RAC; smaller criteria values increase the distance between unit 7 and the 
central module.  
In terms of total costs, mitigation systems are the major contributor factor followed 
by fatality costs and interconnection costs (see Figures 17 and 18). Potential economic 
losses due to structural damage have an insignificant affect and it does not influence layout 
decisions for this particular case. As expected, 95th percentile ranges have a greater impact 
in fatality costs once the risks are relatively higher than mean values. Moreover, a slight 
increase in the total cost can be observed as RAC is changed from 10-3 to 10-5 per year. 
This is attributed to the longer distant between unit 7 and central module which increases 
interconnection cost. Finally, condition (a) presented the lowest result for both risk maps 
while no significant difference was observed between conditions b, c and d. This is 
consequence of the major contribution of protective device costs.  Since there is no space 
available to allocate all storages tanks ( units #4, #5 and #6) in a way that inherently safe 
distances are respected, mitigation systems are required to protect them from escalation 
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vectors. For example, each resulting layout requires that all storage tanks must be 
equipped with blast walls to prevent escalation from overpressure. In addition, with the 
exception of condition (a) in which only one small tank should be protected by fire 
insulation, fire walls must be in place for every tank to prevent fire impingement.  In cases 
where bigger facility areas are available, mitigation systems cost might not play a major 
role and a large variability is expect in the total layout cost as different conditions are 
applied.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Costs contributions for total layout cost applying mean risk values 
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Figure 18: Costs contributions for total layout cost applying the 95th percentile risk 
values 
 
 
 
Figure 19 summarizes the results obtained from both risk maps.  Although 
inhabited buildings, highlighted in green, are located in distinct regions (north direction 
for the 95th percentile and east direction for the mean values) the distances between each 
facility and the main hazardous unit remained constant. This is also observed for the larger 
tank (in red) and the utility (in purple).  Nevertheless, small storage tanks were placed 
closer to the distillation unit when mean values of risk are used.  
Figure 19 also shows the result  obtained from Jung et al. [9]. In this case, 
following the same pattern as shown previously, occupied buildings and the utility were 
placed in low-risk regions. However, a major different is observed in the rearrangement 
of storage tanks. Because  the risk of domino effect was not considered in the first place 
[9], all  storage tanks were located in the surroundings of the distillation unit. Contrarily, 
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in the proposed methodology, the concept of inherently safe distances was introduced 
during layout optimization and a minimal separation must be maintained between process 
equipment.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Comparison between the result from Jung et al. (2010) and the proposed 
methodology 
 
 
 
 
Finally, all problems were solved with a personal computer with an Intel core i5 
processor 2.20 GHz. The MILP model for this case involved 1704 binary variables, 200 
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continuous variables, 3258 constraints, and the solution time was on average 60s, which 
is relatively a short period. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
7.1 Conclusions 
Facility siting and layout configuration are critical factors during design and 
expansion of any industrial installation. Even though there are several reported studies 
incorporating safety into the layout optimization, there is still a need for a method that 
combines layout reformulation and a detailed risk assessment including uncertainties.  
In this work, a risk-based layout optimization tool has been developed to support 
decision-making process during the design phase by providing safer layout options that 
are also cost-efficient. In the first stage, empirical models for fire and explosion scenarios 
as well as toxic chemical releases were implemented in Matlab and coupled with Monte 
Carlo technique to generate risk maps and risk distributions at a particular point of interest. 
Then, domino effect concepts were introduced into the resulted program to generate 
minimal separation distances between process units to avoid escalation events. Finally, a 
MILP formulation is performed  to account individual risk acceptance criteria and  
additional safety features. A grid-based approach was chosen to maintain the linearity of 
the system. 
 The main benefit of the proposed methodology is the flexibility given to the user 
during the layout arrangement. This flexibility is expressed not just in terms of site-
specific data but also when it comes to risk acceptance criteria, which is a reflex of the 
company’s safety culture. Other features included in the proposed method are listed as 
follows:     
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 The program built in Matlab has an interface with excel spreadsheet, which 
allows the user to input easily all parameters required to perform risk 
analysis for a particular processing unit. If a facility has multiple modules, 
this analysis is carried out for each module separately and then combined; 
 The Matlab code can be modified to include extras hazardous scenarios 
that were not addressed such as dust explosion and criogenic hazards; 
 Once the program is running, several risk maps are  generated regarding 
the mean values, maximum values and 95th percentile of the risk. It is role 
of the user decide wich one better fits the purpose;  
 In respect to minimal separation distances, graphics are generated relating 
the frequency of secondary events with distances from the studied module; 
then the user should select the distance based on his/her risk criterion;  
 Finally, additional constraints were included into the layout optimization 
code to overcome the problematic when the facility may occupy more than 
one grid. Moreover, resulting  layouts indicate when mitigation systems are 
required to prevent domino effect.  
 
The applicability of the proposed model was demonstrated through a distillation 
unit that processes hexane and heptane. Several risk maps were obtained, and overall risk 
values ranged from 1x10-15 to 1x10-4  per year at particular points, representing a 
considerable variability. To study the layout arrangement, a sensitivity analysis was 
performed varying risk values, safe distances, and risk acceptance criteria. Even though 
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several layout options were generated, a trend was observed towards placing the 
equipment by its type; high occupancy buildings were placed in regions with low wind 
probabilities and, consequently, lower risks while storage tanks were located nearby the 
distillation module requiring protective devices to avoid escalation events. In conclusion, 
the authors believed this risk-based layout optimization tool has a great potential for real-
world application; its simple interface combined with the low computational work 
required facilitate its usage. 
7.2 Future Work 
Based on the limitations and challenges faced during the execution of this study, there 
are some areas of improvement that should be explored in the future:  
 Even though the Britter and McQuaid model give reasonable results in a relatively
short time, a more detailed dense gas dispersion model  should be applied to 
account for air and conservation equations (mass and energy). It would approach 
more realistic results; 
 Results obtained from the program should be validated by available software and
large-scale test data;  
 In terms of domino effect, this methodology can be combined with the one
proposed by Bernechea [27] to conduct a complete risk assessment including the 
probability of secondary and tertiary events. Additionally, reliability data should 
be added in the QRA program to predict the ability of protective devices to prevent 
initiating events.  It will enhance the understanding of overall risks. 
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 Finally, geographic information systems can be coupled with layout optimization 
technique  to focus on  reduction of risks to the general public, which would help 
the  decision-making process  during land use planning.  
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APPENDIX A 
 COEFFICIENTS FOR TNO MULTI-ENERGY METHOD CURVES 
 
A-1: Values for parameters c and b to estimate scaled overpressure [39] 
Explosion level Scaled distance c b Scaled distance  B d 
1 0.23 ≤ R< 0.6 0.01 0 0.6 ≤ R ≤ 7 6.40 × 10−3 −0.97 
2 0.23 ≤ R < 0.7 2.00 x 10−2 0 0.7 ≤ R ≤ 12 1.32 × 10−2 −0.98 
3 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 5.00 x 10−2 0 0.6 ≤ R ≤  30 6.05 × 10−2 −0.99 
4 0.23 ≤ R < 0.5 1.00 x 10−1 0 0.5 ≤ R ≤  70 6.44 × 10−2 −0.99 
5 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 2.00 x 10−1 0 0.6 ≤ R ≤  90 1.17 × 10−1 −0.99 
6 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 5.00 x 10−1 0 0.6 ≤ R≤  100 3.01 × 10−1 −1.11 
7 0.23 ≤ R < 0.5 1.00 0 0.5 ≤ R ≤  100 4.06 × 10−1 −1.20 
8 0.23 ≤ R < 0.5 2.00 0 0.5 ≤ R < 1 4.76 × 10−1 −2.08 
 1 ≤ R< 2 4.67x10−1 −1.58 2 ≤ R ≤  100 3.18 × 10−1 −1.13 
9 0.23 ≤ R < 0.35 5.00 0 0.35 ≤ R < 1 4.87 × 10−1 −2.03 
 1 ≤ R < 2 4.67x10−1 −1.58 2 ≤ R ≤  100 3.18 × 10−1 −1.13 
10 0.23 ≤ R < 1 4.41x10−1 −2.39 1 ≤ R < 2 4.67 × 10−1 −1.58 
 2 ≤ R ≤  100 3.18x10−1 −1.13    
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A-2: Values for parameters c and b to estimate impulse [39] 
Explosion level Scaled distance c d Scaled distance c d 
1 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 4.41 × 10−2 −0.20 0.6 ≤ R ≤  7 2.96 × 10−2 −0.94 
2 0.23 ≤ R < 0.7 5.22 × 10−2 −0.27 0.7 ≤ R ≤ 12 4.03 × 10−2 −1.05 
3 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 8.74 × 10−2 −0.20 0.6 ≤ R ≤  30 6.05 × 10−2 −0.99 
4 0.23 ≤ R < 0.5 1.4 × 10−1 0 0.5 ≤ R ≤  70 6.77 × 10−2 −0.97 
5 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 1.25 × 10−1 −0.26 0.6 ≤ R ≤  90 8.46 × 10−2 −1.00 
6 0.23 ≤ R < 0.8 1.28 × 10−1 −0.45 0.8 ≤ R≤  100 1.14 × 10−1 −1.03 
7 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 1.98 × 10−1 −0.49 0.6 ≤ R ≤  100 1.14 × 10−1 −1. 03 
8 0.23 ≤ R < 0.6 1.66 × 10−1 −0.90 0.6 ≤ R ≤  100 1.14 × 10−1 −1. 03 
9 0.23 ≤ R < 0.3 1.11 0.89 0.3 ≤ R < 0.4 3.08 × 10−1 −1.08 
 0.4 ≤ R< 0.8 8.08 × 10−2 −2.26 0.8 ≤ R ≤  100 1.14 × 10−1 −1.03 
10 0.23 ≤ R< 0.3 10.82 1.14 0.3 ≤ R < 0.4 3.15 × 10−1 −1.79 
 0.4 ≤ R < 0.5 1.30 × 10−3 −7.52 0.5 ≤ R ≤ 100 1.14 × 10−1 −1.03 
 
Data obtained from:  Díaz Alonso, F., et al., Characteristic overpressure–impulse–distance curves for the detonation of 
explosives, pyrotechnics or unstable substances. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, 
2006. 19(6): p. 724-728. 
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APPENDIX B 
FAILURE DATA 
 
Hole diameter 
range (mm) 
Centrifugal 
pump 
Process 
vessel 
Heat 
exchanger 
Valve 
(0.150m ID) 
Steel pipe 
(0.10m ID) 
Steel pipe 
(0.15m ID) 
Steel pipe 
(0.50m ID) 
1 to 3 3.4E-03 3.9E-04 1.2E-03 3.1E-05 2.0E-06b 2.6E-05 2.3E-05 
3 to 10 1.0E-03 2.0E-04 4.1E-04 1.2E-06 2.0E-06b 8.5E-06 7.5E-06 
10 to 50 2.9E-04 1.0E-04 1.4E-04 4.7E-06 1.0E-06b 2.7E-06 2.4E-06 
50 to 150 5.4E-04 2.7E-05 2.4E-05 2.4E-06 5.0E-07b 6.0E-07 3.6E-07 
>150 - 2.4E-05 1.2E-05 - - - 1.6E-07 
Catastrophic 
Failure 
5.4E-04 2.4E-05 1.2E-05 2.4E-06 5.0E-07b 6.0E-07 1.6E-07 
 
Data obtained from:  International Association of Oil and Gas Producers, Risk Assessment Data Directory, Process release 
frequencies.  2010, OGP. 
b Health and Safety Executive, Failure Rate and Event Data use within Risk Assessments. 2012, HSE  
p. 96. 
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APPENDIX C 
CODE FOR THE RISK ASSESSMENT TOOL 
%Case study, distillation column  
clear all  
  
module= xlsread('input_data.xlsx','Module_export'); 
failure_data=xlsread('input_data.xlsx','Failure data'); 
chem_data=xlsread('input_data.xlsx','data_export'); 
scenarios=xlsread('input_data.xlsx','consequence_modeling_export'); 
m_size=xlsread('input_data.xlsx','module_size'); 
  
n=10000; % number of trials  
  
%Vectors 
inst=zeros(1,n); 
  
% Number of scenarios 
ns=length(module(:,1)); 
  
% Input data 
ting=180; %Ignition time  
ds=[45 45 1]; %Site dimension  
hg=1; 
d=0:hg:2*ds(1); 
  
  
% Environmental Conditions 
rh=20; 
spaw = 15.08; 
spbw = 5514; 
Ta=298; %K 
rhoa=1.1477e00; %Kg/m3 
T=298;% Gas constant 
Pa=101.315; % Ambient pressure (kPa)  
R=8.314; 
stab_vector=['A' 'B' 'C' 'D' 'F']; 
  
% Source condition 
dso=[0 0 0]; 
trmax=600; %(s) maximum release time  
  
%Cloud center   
xc=zeros(n,1); 
  
%% Virtual Number of leaks (nvl) 
hx=m_size(4); 
hy=m_size(5); 
nvl=m_size(6); 
  
if (nvl~=0) 
    % Unit size  
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    ux=-m_size(2)/2:hx:m_size(2)/2; 
    uy=-m_size(3)/2:hy:m_size(3)/2; 
  
    % Leak point and its position [number xi yi] 
    lp=zeros(length(ux)*length(uy),3); 
    lp(:,1)=[1:length(ux)*length(uy)]; 
    for j=1:length(uy) 
    lp((j-1)*length(ux)+1:j*length(ux),2)=ux; 
    lp((j-1)*length(ux)+1:j*length(ux),3)=uy(j); 
    end 
else  
    lp=zeros(1,3); 
    lp(1,1)=1; 
    nvl=1; 
end  
  
%% Frequency release  
  
for j=1:n 
    i2(j)=randi([1,ns]); %selection of the scenario 
    %selection of hole size  
    f_hole_size(j)=0;  
    while f_hole_size(j)==0 
      hole_size(j)=randi([2 500]);  
      c=find_column(hole_size(j),failure_data(:,1)); 
f_hole_size(j)=failure_data(c,module(i2(j),2)+1)*module(i2(j),3); 
    end 
    c=length(failure_data(:,1)); 
    fcat(j)=failure_data(c,module(i2(j),2)+1)*module(i2(j),3); 
    
[mg(j),ml(j),ftype(j),MW(j)]=mass_release(i2(j),hole_size(j),module,che
m_data); 
end 
  
  
%% Stochastic Variables  
for j=1:n 
ua(j)=randi([1 6]); 
tr(j)=module(i2(j),8)/(mg(j)+ml(j)); 
if (tr(j)>trmax) 
        tr(j)=trmax; 
end 
stab(j)=stab_vector(randi([1,5]));  
c1(j)=randi([1,8]); 
h(j)=randi([0,20]); %release height  
theta(j)=randi([0,8])*45; 
vli(j)=randi([1,nvl]); %leak position  
end 
  
%Coordinates N:270 E:0 S:90 W:180 
  
theta= randsample([0:7],n,true,[0.1 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.1 0.1])*45; 
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%% Continuous Release  
  
[Pe1,Psd1,Pvce_I,Pjf]=continuous(mg(1),ml(1),d,ua(1),i2(1),stab(1),ting
,hole_size(1),tr(1),ds,module(i2(1),8),c1(1),h(1),hg,module,chem_data); 
l=imrotate(Pe1,45); 
Pe=zeros(length(l),length(l),n); 
Psd=zeros(length(l),length(l),n); 
  
pos=-hg*(round(length(l)/2)-1):hg:(round(length(l)/2)-1)*hg; 
  
  
d=0:hg:2*ds(1); 
  
  
for j=1:n 
if (f_hole_size(j)~=fcat(j))     
    ting=randi([9 18])*10; 
    
[Pjf,Pff,Pvce_fat,Pvce_sd,Psd_pf,P_pf]=continuous(mg(j),ml(j),d,ua(j),i
2(j),stab(j),ting,hole_size(j),tr(j),ds,module(i2(j),8),c1(j),h(j),hg,m
odule,chem_data); 
  
    %% Leak position  
    xi=find(pos==lp(vli(j),2),1); 
    yi=find(pos==lp(vli(j),3),1); 
         
    %% Jef Fire  
    JF=myinsertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),Pjf/6,xi,yi)*scenarios(2,2); 
    %% Flash Fire  
    FF1=imrotate(Pff,theta(j)); 
    FF2=myinsertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),FF1,xi,yi)*scenarios(3,2); 
         
    %% VCE  
    % fatalities 
    VCE_fat1=imrotate(Pvce_fat,theta(j)); 
    VCE_fat2=myinsertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),VCE_fat1,xi,yi)*scenarios(4,2); 
  
    % Structural Damage 
    VCE_sd1=imrotate(Pvce_sd,theta(j)); 
    VCE_sd2=myinsertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),VCE_sd1,xi,yi)*scenarios(4,2); 
    VCE_sd3=insertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),VCE_sd1)*scenarios(4,2); 
  
    %% Pool Fire  
    %center position 
    [Q,P]=size(Pe(:,:,j)); 
    xi=round(Q/2); 
    yi=round(Q/2); 
     
    % fatalities 
    PF_fat=insertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),P_pf)*scenarios(5,2); 
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    % Structural Damage 
    PF_sd=insertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),Psd_pf)*scenarios(5,2); 
  
    %% Total Pobability 
    % Fatalities  
    Pe(:,:,j)=(1-(1-JF).*(1-FF2).*(1-VCE_fat2).*(1-
PF_fat)).*f_hole_size(j); 
    Pe(:,:,j)=preve_nan(Pe(:,:,j)); 
    % Structural Damage 
    Psd(:,:,j)=(1-(1-JF).*(1-FF2).*(1-VCE_sd2).*(1-
PF_sd))*f_hole_size(j); 
    Psd(:,:,j)=preve_nan(Psd(:,:,j)); 
  
     
     
     
%% Clear 
    clear JF FF2 VCE_sd2 VCE_sd1 VCE_fat2 VCE_fat1 PF_fat PF_sd FF1 
end 
end  
  
  
  
%% CATASTROPHIC SCENARIO  
  
mliq=scenarios(2,4); 
mvapor=scenarios(1,4); 
  
for j=1:n 
if (f_hole_size(j)==fcat(j)) 
    ting=randi([9 18])*10; 
    
[Pbleve_sd,Pvce_sd,Pbleve_fat,Pvce_fat,Pff,P_pf,Psd_pf]=catastrophic(mv
apor,mliq,d,ua(j),i2(j),stab(j),ting,hg,module,chem_data,scenarios);  
%% Leak position  
    xi=find(pos==lp(vli(j),2),1); 
    yi=find(pos==lp(vli(j),3),1); 
     
    %% BLEVE  
    BLEVE_sd=insertMatrix(Psd(:,:,j),Pbleve_sd); 
    BLEVE_fat=insertMatrix(Psd(:,:,j),Pbleve_fat); 
  
    %% VCE  
    % fatalities 
    VCE_fat1=imrotate(Pvce_fat,theta(j))*scenarios(4,2); 
    VCE_fat2=myinsertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),VCE_fat1,xi,yi)*scenarios(4,2); 
  
    % Structural Damage 
    VCE_sd1=imrotate(Pvce_sd,theta(j))*scenarios(4,2); 
    VCE_sd2=myinsertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),VCE_sd1,xi,yi); 
  
    %% Pool Fire  
    % fatalities 
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    PF_fat=insertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),P_pf)*scenarios(5,2); 
  
    % Structural Damage 
    PF_sd=insertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),Psd_pf)*scenarios(5,2); 
  
    %% Flash Fire  
    FF1=imrotate(Pff,theta(j))*scenarios(3,2); 
    FF2=myinsertMatrix(Pe(:,:,j),FF1,xi,yi)*scenarios(3,2); 
  
    % Fatalities  
Pe(:,:,j)=Pe(:,:,j) + (1-(1-BLEVE_fat).*(1-FF2).*(1-VCE_fat2).*(1-
PF_fat)).*fcat(i2(j)); 
    Pe(:,:,j)=preve_nan(Pe(:,:,j)); 
    % Structural Damage 
    Psd(:,:,j)=Psd(:,:,j)+ (1-(1-BLEVE_sd).*(1-PF_sd).*(1-
VCE_sd2)).*fcat(i2(j)); 
    Psd(:,:,j)=preve_nan(Psd(:,:,j)); 
    %% Clear 
    clear BLEVE_fat BLEVE_sd  FF1 FF2 VCE_sd2 VCE_sd1 VCE_fat2 VCE_fat1 
PF_fat PF_sd 
end 
end 
  
%% Statistical Analysis  
  
save data.mat Pe Psd ds hg -v7.3 
  
index=find(d==ds(1),1); 
index2=round(length(Pe(:,:,1))/2)-index; 
index3=round(length(Pe(:,:,1))/2)+index; 
  
x=-ds(1):hg:ds(1); 
  
for i=1:length(x); 
for  j=1:length(x) 
    Pemax(i,j)=max(Pe(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:)); 
    Pemin(i,j)=min(Pe(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:)); 
    Pemean(i,j)=mean(Pe(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:)); 
     
    if (Pemean(i,j)==NaN) 
        Pemean=Pemean(i-1,j-1); 
    end 
     
     
    Pe5th(i,j)=prctile(Pe(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:),5); 
    Pe95th(i,j)=prctile(Pe(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:),95); 
     
    Psd_max(i,j)=max(Psd(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:)); 
    Psd_min(i,j)=min(Psd(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:)); 
    Psd_mean(i,j)=mean(Psd(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:)); 
    Psd5th(i,j)=prctile(Psd(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:),5); 
    Psd95th(i,j)=prctile(Psd(i+index2-1,j+index2-1,:),95); 
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end 
end 
 
size(Pemax) 
x=-ds(1):hg:ds(1); 
[X,Y]=meshgrid(x,x); 
  
figure  
subplot(1,2,1) 
loglog(x,Pemax(index,:)) 
hold on 
loglog(x,Pemean(index,:)) 
loglog(x,Pemin(index,:)) 
loglog(x,Pe5th(index,:)) 
loglog(x,Pe95th(index,:)) 
xlabel('Distance from the unit (m)') 
ylabel('Risk of fatality (per year)'); 
legend('Maximum','Mean','Minimum','5th percentile', '95th percentile') 
  
legend('Maximum','Mean','Minimum','5th percentile', '95th percentile') 
subplot(1,2,2) 
loglog(x,Psd_max(index,:)) 
hold on 
loglog(x,Psd_mean(index,:)) 
loglog(x,Psd_min(index,:)) 
loglog(x,Psd5th(index,:)) 
loglog(x,Psd95th(index,:)) 
xlabel('Distance from the unit (m)') 
ylabel('Risk of Structural Damage (per year)'); 
legend('Maximum','Mean','Minimum','5th percentile', '95th percentile') 
hold off 
  
figure  
subplot(3,2,1)        
mesh(Pemax) 
title('Maximum Fatality Risk') 
  
subplot(3,2,2)        
mesh(Psd_max) 
title('Maximum Structural Damage Risk') 
  
subplot(3,2,3)       
mesh(Pemean) 
title('Mean value of the Fatality Risk') 
  
subplot(3,2,4)        
mesh(Psd_mean)    
title('Mean value of the Structural Damage Risk') 
  
subplot(3,2,5)        
mesh(Pe5th) 
title('5th percentile of  Fatality Risk') 
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subplot(3,2,6)        
mesh(Psd5th)     
title('5th Precentile Structural Damage Risk') 
  
hold off  
  
  
%% Histogram  
i10=find(pos==10,1); 
i50=find(pos==50,1); 
i80=find(pos==80,1); 
  
  
n0=round(length(Pe(:,:,1))/2); 
  
for j=1:n 
risk10_Pe(j)=Pe(n0,i10,j); 
risk10_SD(j)=Psd(n0,i10,j); 
risk50_Pe(j)=Pe(n0,i50,j); 
risk50_SD(j)=Psd(n0,i50,j); 
risk100_Pe(j)=Pe(n0,i80,j); 
risk100_SD(j)=Psd(n0,i80,j); 
end 
  
  
bp(1:n,1)=risk10_Pe; 
bp(n+1:2*n,1)=risk50_Pe; 
bp(2*n+1:3*n,1)=risk100_Pe; 
bp(1:n,2)=risk10_SD; 
bp(n+1:2*n,2)=risk50_SD; 
bp(2*n+1:3*n,2)=risk100_Pe; 
  
  
bp(1:n,3)=risk10_Pe; 
bp(n+1:2*n,3)=risk50_Pe; 
bp(2*n+1:3*n,3)=risk100_Pe; 
  
  
  
  
a = ['x=10m';'x=50m';'x=80m'] 
celldata = cellstr(a) 
  
for j=1:n 
bc(j,1)=celldata(1); 
bc(j+n,1)=celldata(2); 
bc(j+2*n,1)=celldata(3); 
end 
  
figure  
subplot(1,2,1) 
title('Fatality Risk'); 
boxplot(bp(:,1),bc(:,1)) 
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subplot(1,2,2) 
title('Strutural Damage Risk'); 
boxplot(bp(:,2),bc(:,1)) 
  
  
  
     
%%  Exporting to Excel  
    %v=export_excel(d0,d1,d,risk) 
    %d0= vector the facility dimensions  
    d0=[45 45]; 
    %d1= distance bewteen the center of each grid  
    d1=10; 
  
    vector(1,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Pemax); 
    vector(2,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Pemin); 
    vector(3,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Pemean); 
    vector(4,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Pe5th); 
    vector(5,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Pe95th); 
     
    xlswrite('results.xls',vector','Fatality Risk','B2'); 
                
    vector2(1,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Psd_max); 
    vector2(2,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Psd_min); 
    vector2(3,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Psd_mean); 
    vector2(4,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Psd5th); 
    vector2(5,:)=export_excel(d0,d1,x,Psd95th); 
     
    xlswrite('results.xls',vector2','Structural Risk','B2'); 
     
    %Positions 
    y=-d0(2):d1:d0(2); 
    %X positions;    
    x=-d0(1):d1:d0(1); 
     
 for i=1:length(y) 
    dt2(1,(i-1)*length(y)+1:(i)*length(y))=x; 
    dt2(2,(i-1)*length(y)+1:(i)*length(y))=y(i)*ones(1,length(y)); 
 end 
    dt2(3,:)=abs(dt2(1,:))+abs(dt2(2,:)); 
     
    xlswrite('results.xls',dt2','Distances100','B2'); 
 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% Main Functions %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% continuous %%%%%%%%%% 
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function 
[Pjf,Pff,Pvce_fat,Pvce_sd,Psd_pf,P_pf]=continuous(mg,ml,d,ua,i2,stab,ti
ng,hole_size,tr,ds,mt,c1,h,hg,module,chem_data)  
 
  
% Environmental Conditions 
[rh,spaw,spbw,Ta,rhoa,g,Pa]=env_cond(); 
  
% Component Characteristics  
[T,P,ftype,phi]=scen_type(i2,module); 
[AIT,MIE,lfl,ufl,M,k,Tb,Psat,thermo_data,hc,cp,hv]=component(ftype,chem
_data,P); 
   
%% Gas dispersion (Section 2.2) 
 
rho=1/thermo_data(1,5); 
 
if (rho>rhoa) % Heavy gas  
    vol=mg*thermo_data(1,5); 
    [v,xc,Lb]=bm_plume(vol,ua,lfl,rho,hole_size,ting); 
    if(tr<0.6*xc/ua)||(tr<300) 
        vol=mg*tr*thermo_data(1,5); 
        [v,xc]=bm_puff(vol,ua,lfl,rho,ting); 
    end  
else  
  
[mf,xc,conc,inst,sigmay,sigmaz]=gpm(mg,ua,dso,c1,h,stab,ufl,lfl,ds,ting
,tr,MW); 
   mf=subplus(mf); 
   v=zeros(n,1); 
    if (mf>=0) 
       
[v,iu,il]=volume_light_gas(xc,inst,conc,d,sigmay,sigmaz,h,lfl,ufl,M); 
     end 
   v=max(v,0); 
end 
  
%% Probability of Ignition  
     
[Pimm_ign,Pdel_ign,Pexp]=Prob(ml+mg,tr,T,AIT,MIE,P); 
  
%% VCE Modeling  
  
    % Input     
    %Stochastic Variable 
    s=randi([1,4]); % Severity Level  
    eff=randi([15,40])/100; % Efficiency 
     
   [Psvce,Ivce]=vce(v,eff,d,s,xc,hg); 
   
   % Probability 
    Pvce_ign=(1-Pimm_ign).*(Pdel_ign).*(Pexp); 
    %Death from Impact  
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     Y_vce=max(-46.1+4.82*log(Ivce),0); 
     Pvce_I=50*(1+(Y_vce-5)./abs((Y_vce-5)).*erf(abs((Y_vce-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pvce_ign; 
      
     %Death from Overpressure  
    Y_vce=max(-77.1+6.91*log(Ivce),0); 
    Pvce_fat=50*(1+(Y_vce-5)./abs((Y_vce-5)).*erf(abs((Y_vce-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pvce_ign;  
      
    %Probability of fatality (Union of prob from impact and prob from 
     %overpressure 
    Pvce_fat=1-(1-Pvce_fat).*(1-Pvce_I);  
       
   % Structural Damage  
    Y_vce=max(-23.8 +2.92*log(Psvce),0); 
    Pvce_sd=50*(1+(Y_vce-5)./abs((Y_vce-5)).*erf(abs((Y_vce-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pvce_ign; 
            
         
%%  Jet Fire  
yjf=zeros(length(d)); 
thetajv=100;  
dia=hole_size/1000; 
[W1,W2,rl]=jetfire(mg,dia,ua,thetajv,thermo_data,T,M,k,hc); 
rl=min(rl,max(d)); 
  
rl=min(rl,max(d)); 
  
% Damage radius  
d1=-max(d):hg:max(d); 
[X,Y]=meshgrid(d1,d1); 
Pjf=max(rl^2-X.^2-Y.^2,0); 
Pjf=min(Pjf,1)*Pimm_ign; 
  
  
%% Flash Fire  
Pff=zeros(length(d)); 
if (rho>rhoa) % Heavy gas  
    ylfl=zeros(1,length(d)); 
    cont=1; 
    j2=[]; 
         
    vol=mg*thermo_data(1,5); 
    [v,xc,Lb]=bm_plume(vol,ua,lfl/2,rho,hole_size,ting); 
    xlfl=xc*2; 
     
    % LFL/2 Contour  
    b0=hole_size/2/1000; 
        
    for i=1:length(d) 
        if (d(i)<=xlfl) 
            ylfl(i)=(2*b0+8*Lb+2.5*(Lb^(1/3))*(d(i)^(2/3)))/2; 
        else  
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            continue 
        end 
    end 
      
    if(tr<2.5*xc/ua)||(tr<=300)||(Lb>=100) 
         
        vol=mg*thermo_data(1,5)*ting        
[v,xc,bt]=bm_puff(vol,ua,lfl/2,rho,ting); 
        cont=cont+1; 
        ylfl=real(sqrt((bt^2-(d-xc).^2))); 
  
    end  
 
% Probability of Death 
    if (v>0) 
    for k=1:length(d) 
         for i=1:length(d)  
           if (round(ylfl(k))>=d(i))&&(round(ylfl(k))>0) 
                Pff(k,i)=1; 
           end 
         end 
    end 
     
    end 
     
     
else  
    
% Finding the burning zone (between xufl and xlfl/2) 
      clfl=lfl*Pa*MW/Ta/R; 
      cufl=ufl*Pa*MW/Ta/R; 
       [cmax,imax]=max(conc(:,1)); 
       [cmin,imin]=min(conc(imax:length(d),1)); 
       imin=imin+imax-1; 
        
       if (inst==1) 
           ixufl=xc; 
         % finding xlfl 
          
         if(cmin>=clfl/2)&&(cmin<xufl) 
             xlfl=d(imin); 
         else  
             for i=1:imax 
                 if (conc(i,1)<=clfl/2) 
                     xlfl1=d(i); 
                 else  
                     xlfl1=0; 
                     continue 
                 end 
             end 
              
             for i=imax:length(d) 
                 if (conc(i,1)>=clfl/2) 
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                     xlfl2=d(i); 
                 else  
                     continue 
                 end 
             end 
         end 
        % Cloud radius 
        rb=max(abs(xlfl1-xufl),abs(xlfl2-xufl)); 
        ylfl=real(sqrt((bt^2-(d-xufl).^2))); 
                        
       else 
    if(cmax<clfl) 
        v=0; 
        ixufl=1; 
        ixlfl=1; 
    else          
         % finding xufl 
                 
         if (cmax<cufl) 
             ixufl=1; 
             for i=1:imax 
                 if (conc(i,1)<=clfl/2) 
                     ixufl=i; 
                 else 
                     continue 
                 end 
             end 
          else 
             for i=imax:imin 
                 if (conc(i,1)>=cufl) 
                     ixufl=i; 
                 else 
                     continue 
                 end 
             end 
         end 
          
         % finding xlfl 
          
         [cmin,imin]=min(conc(ixufl:length(d),1));  
         imin=ixufl+imin-1; 
         if(cmin>=clfl/2) 
             ixlfl=imin; 
         else 
              
             for i=(ixufl):imin 
                 if (conc(i,1)>=clfl/2) 
                     ixlfl=i; 
                 else 
                     continue 
                 end 
             end 
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         end 
          
    end 
       for i=ixufl:ixlfl 
       ylfl(i)=round(sigmay(i).*sqrt(2*conc(i,1)./clfl*2)); 
       end 
        
       %Probability of death 
       if (cmax>clfl/2) 
                
       for k=ixufl:ixlfl 
         if  (round(ylfl(k)) >0) 
             for i=1:round(ylfl(k)) 
                    Pff(k,i)=1; 
             end 
         end 
       end 
       end 
      
   end 
     
end 
  
Pff_ign=(1-Pimm_ign).*(Pdel_ign).*(1-Pexp); 
Pff=Pff_ign*Pff; 
Pff=rot(d,0,Pff,hg); 
  
%% Pool Fire  
Ppf_ign=Pff_ign; 
eff=randi([6 8])/10; 
[P_pf,Psd_pf]=poolfire(ml,eff,d,hg,Tb,thermo_data,hc,cp,hv); 
P_pf=P_pf*Pff_ign; 
Psd_pf=Psd_pf*Pff_ign; 
end  
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% catastrophic %%%%%%%%%% 
 
function 
[Pbleve_sd,Pvce_sd,Pbleve_fat,Pvce_fat,Pff,P_pf,Psd_pf]=catastrophic(mv
0,ml0,d,ua,i2,stab,ting,hg,module,chem_data,scenarios) 
% Return the effects of a catastrophic event 
 
% Environmental Conditions 
[rh,spaw,spbw,Ta,rhoa,g,Pa]=env_cond(); 
  
% Component Characteristics 
[T,P,ftype,phi]=scen_type(i2,module); 
[AIT,MIE,lfl,ufl,M,k,Tb,Psat,thermo_data,hc,cp,hv]=component(ftype,chem
_data,P); 
  
%% Flashing Liquids  
    if (T>Tb)   
    fv=min(2*cp*(T-Tb)/hv,1);  
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    % Droplets consideration (fraction = fv) 
    mv=mv0+fv*ml0; 
    ml=(1-fv)*ml0; 
    else  
    mv=mv0; 
    ml=ml0; 
    end     
 %% Gas Dispersion  
rho=1/thermo_data(1,5); 
if (rho>rhoa) % Heavy gas  
    vol=mv*thermo_data(1,5); 
    [v,xc,bt]=bm_puff(vol,ua,lfl,rho,ting); 
else     
     
[mf,xc,c,inst,sigmay,sigmaz]=gpm_puff(q,ua,dso,c1,h,stab,ufl,lfl,ds,te,
MW); 
      mf=subplus(mf); 
     
[v,iu,il]=volume_light_gas(xc,inst,conc,d,sigmay,sigmaz,h,lfl,ufl,M); 
     v=max(v,0); 
end 
  
%% Probability of Ignition  
  
[Pimm_ign,Pdel_ign,Pexp]=Prob(ml+mv,60,T,AIT,MIE,P); 
  
prob=[Pimm_ign,Pdel_ign,Pexp]; 
 
%% BLEVE Modeling    
   if (scenarios(1,2)==1) 
   % Input data  
    mawp=1.10; %MPa 
    po=1.2; % failure overpressure  
    psv=(P+1.013)*100e3; %Pa 
       
    
[delta_p,q,t,I]=BLEVE(mawp,po,ml0,mv0,psv,cp,hc,hv,thermo_data,d,hg); 
    ps=delta_p*Pa*1e3; 
     
    % Probability 
    % Burn death from fireball  
    V=t*q.^(4/3)*1e-04; 
    Y_bleve=-14.6+2.56*log(V); 
    Pbleve_fb=50*(1+(Y_bleve-5)./abs((Y_bleve-5)).*erf(abs((Y_bleve-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pimm_ign; 
     
    %Death from Impact  
    Y_bleve=-46.1+4.82*log(I); 
    Pbleve_I=50*(1+(Y_bleve-5)./abs((Y_bleve-5)).*erf(abs((Y_bleve-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pimm_ign; 
     
    %Death from Overpressure  
    Y_bleve=-77.1+6.91*log(ps); 
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    Pbleve_fat=50*(1+(Y_bleve-5)./abs((Y_bleve-5)).*erf(abs((Y_bleve-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pimm_ign; 
     
     
%Total probability of fatalities  
    Pbleve_fat=1-(1-Pbleve_I).*(1-Pbleve_fat).*(1-Pbleve_fb); 
            
    %Structural Damage  
    Y_bleve=-23.8+2.92*log(ps); 
    Pbleve_sd=50*(1+(Y_bleve-5)./abs((Y_bleve-5)).*erf(abs((Y_bleve-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pimm_ign; 
   else 
   Pbleve_sd=zeros(length(d)); 
   Pbleve_fat=zeros(length(d)); 
   end 
    %% VCE Modeling 
if(scenarios(4,2)==1) 
    % Input     
    %Stochastic Variable 
    s=randi([1,4]); % Severity Level  
    eff=randi([15,40])/100; % Efficiency 
    [Psvce,Ivce]=vce(v,eff,d,s,xc,hg); 
    
   % Probability 
    Pvce_ign=(1-Pimm_ign).*(Pdel_ign).*(Pexp); 
    %Death from Impact  
    Y_vce=max(-46.1+4.82*log(Ivce),0); 
    Pvce_I=50*(1+(Y_vce-5)./abs((Y_vce-5)).*erf(abs((Y_vce-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pvce_ign; 
    %Death from Overpressure  
    Y_vce=max(-77.1+6.91*log(Psvce),0); 
    Pvce_fat=50*(1+(Y_vce-5)./abs((Y_vce-5)).*erf(abs((Y_vce-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pvce_ign; 
     
    %Total probability of fatalities  
    Pvce_fat=1-(1-Pvce_I).*(1-Pvce_fat);     
      
   % Structural Damage  
         Y_vce=max(-23.8 +2.92*log(Psvce),0); 
         Pvce_sd=50*(1+(Y_vce-5)./abs((Y_vce-5)).*erf(abs((Y_vce-
5)/sqrt(2))))/100*Pvce_ign; 
else 
 Pvce_sd=zeros(length(d)); 
 Pvce_fat=Pvce_sd; 
end  
     
%% Flash Fire      
Pff=zeros(length(d),length(d)); 
if (rho>rhoa) % Heavy gas  
   [v,xc,bt]=bm_puff(vol,ua,lfl/2,rho,ting); 
    ylfl=real(sqrt((bt^2-(d-xc).^2))); 
    % Probability of Death 
    if (v>0) 
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    for k=1:length(d) 
            for i=1:length(d)  
                if (round(ylfl(k))>=d(i))&&(round(ylfl(k))>0) 
                Pff(k,i)=1; 
                end 
            end 
    end 
    end 
   
else  
  
% Finding the burning zone (between xufl and xlfl/2) 
       clfl=lfl*Pa*MW/Ta/R; 
       cufl=ufl*Pa*MW/Ta/R; 
       [cmax,imax]=max(conc(:,1)); 
       [cmin,imin]=min(conc(imax:length(d),1)); 
       imin=imin+imax-1; 
       ixufl=xc; 
         % finding xlfl 
         if(cmin>=clfl/2)&&(cmin<xufl) 
             xlfl=d(imin); 
         else  
             for i=1:imax 
                 if (conc(i,1,j)<=clfl/2) 
                     xlfl1=d(i); 
                 else  
                     xlfl1=0; 
                     continue 
                 end 
             end 
              
             for i=imax:length(d) 
                 if (conc(i,1)>=clfl/2) 
                     xlfl2=d(i); 
                 else  
                     continue 
                 end 
             end 
         end 
        % Cloud radius 
        rb=max(abs(xlfl1-xufl),abs(xlfl2-xufl)); 
        ylfl=real(sqrt((rb^2-(d-xufl).^2))); 
                      
        
 %Probability of death 
     if (cmax>clfl/2)              
       for k=ixufl:ixlfl 
         if  (round(ylfl(k))>0) 
             for i=1:round(ylfl(k)) 
                    Pff(k,i)=1; 
             end 
         end 
      end 
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    end 
       
 end 
  
Pff_ign=(1-Pimm_ign).*(Pdel_ign).*(1-Pexp); 
Pff=Pff*Pff_ign; 
Pff=rot(d,0,Pff,hg); 
  
  
%% Pool Fire  
eff=randi([6 8])/10; 
Ppf_ign=Pff_ign; 
[P_pf,Psd_pf] =poolfire_cat(ml,eff,d,hg,Tb,thermo_data,hc,cp,hv); 
P_pf=P_pf*Ppf_ign; 
Psd_pf=Psd_pf*Ppf_ign; 
End  
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% Prob %%%%%%%%%% 
 
function [Pimm_ign,Pdel_ign,Pexp]=Prob(FR,time,T,AIT,MIE,P) 
% Return the values for probabilities (immediate, delayed and 
explosion) 
 
%Unit conversion 
  
%T = Process Temperature (F) 
T=(T-273.15)*9/5 +32; 
AIT=(AIT-273.15)*9/5 +32;  
%P= Process pressure (psig) 
P=P*14.5; 
% Release Rate  
FR=2.2*FR; 
  
%% Immediate Ignition  
Pai=1-5000*exp(-9.5*T/AIT); 
  
if (T/AIT<0.9) 
    Pai=0; 
elseif (T/AIT>1.2) 
    Pai=1; 
end     
Pimm_ign= Pai + 0.0024*P^(1/3)/(MIE)^(2/3); 
if (Pimm_ign>1) 
    Pimm_ign=1; 
end 
  
%% Delayed Ignition  
  
% Modifiers 
% Material Released 
M1=min(0.6-.85*log10(MIE),3); 
if (M1<=0.1) 
    M1=0.1; 
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end 
  
% Magnitude Of release 
M2=min(7*exp(0.42*log(FR)-4.67),2); 
  
%Duration of the release 
s_vector=[0.5 0.25 0.1]; % depends on the equipment density 
s=s_vector(randi([1 3])); 
M3=(1-(1-s^2)*exp(-0.015*s*time))/0.3; 
  
Mp=M1*M3*M2;  
  
if (Mp>1) 
    Pdel_ign=1-(0.7/Mp); 
else 
    Pdel_ign=0.3*Mp; 
end 
  
%% Delayed Ignition resulting in an explosion 
Pexp=min(0.024*FR^0.435,.7); 
  
end 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% VCE %%%%%%%%%% 
function [Ps,I]=vce(V,eff,d,s,xc,hg) 
% Input 
% V= volume of the gas cloud  
% eff= efficiency (random variable 0.15-0.40) 
% d=Distances from the centre of explosion  
% s= Severity level  
d1=-max(d):hg:max(d); 
% Grid  
     xc=min(xc,10); 
    [X,Y]=meshgrid(d1-xc,d1); 
  
 %Parameters 
  % Hc= Heat of combustion (J/m3) 
    Hc=3.6e6;  
  % Atmospheric pressure(Pa) 
    p0=101.315e3;   
  % Sound Speed  
  c0=343; %m/s 
  
%Energy Released  
E=Hc*V*eff; 
  
%Sachs-Scale Distance  
R=sqrt(X.^2+Y.^2)./(E/p0)^(1/3); 
  
c=[0.0065 0.015 0.035 0.075 0.12 0.35]; 
ps1=[0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4]; 
  
Ps=c(s).*p0./R; 
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% Estimation of the Impulse  
coeff=[-5 -5 -2.5 -4/3 -7/6 -0.6]; 
b0=[6 4 2.5 1.7 .95 .4]; 
tsf=[5 3 2 1.3 .6 0]; 
zf=[.5 .5 .5 .6 .6 .5]; 
cont=1; 
ts=tsf(s)+zeros(length(R)); 
ts(1:cont,1:cont)=10.^(log10(b0(s))+coeff(s).*(R(1:cont,1:cont)-0.3)); 
     
if (s==6) 
ts=10.^(.35+.001368.*(R-0.5)); 
ts(1:cont,1:cont)=10.^(log10(b0(s))+coeff(s).*(R(1:cont,1:cont)-0.3)); 
      for j=cont:length(d) 
        if (R(1,j)<=5) 
            cont1=j; 
        else 
          continue 
        end 
      end 
      
ts(cont+1:cont1,cont+1:cont1)=10.^(log10(.28)+.015556.*(R(cont+1:cont1,
cont+1:cont1)-0.5)); 
    end 
   
    ts=(E/p0)^(1/3)*ts/c0; 
    I=ts.*Ps/2;  
   
end 
         
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% Pool Fire %%%%%%%%%% 
unction [prob,psd]=poolfire(m,n,d,hg,Tb,thermo_data,hc,cp,hv) 
  
%Input parameters  
% ftype=fluid type  
% Hc=heat cof combustion  
% Hv= heat of vaporisation  
% n= fraction of combustion  
% m= mass released rate  
% Cp= specific heat  
% Tbp = Boiling point  
% rho= density 
% r= Position vector  
% theta-wind direction 
r1=-max(d):hg:max(d); 
if (m>0) 
    [X,Y]=meshgrid(r1,r1); 
    rho=1/thermo_data(1,4); 
  
    % Environmental Conditions 
    rh=20; 
    spaw = 15.08; 
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    spbw = 5514; 
    Ta=298; %K 
    rhoa=1.1477e00; %Kg/m3 
    g=9.8; %m/s2 
  
  
    %Vertical rate of liquid level decrease  
    Hmod=hv+cp*(Tb-Ta); 
    y=1.27*1e-6*hc/Hmod; 
  
    % Mass burning rate  
    mbr=rho*y; 
  
    % Pool diameter 
    D=sqrt(4*m/pi/mbr); 
  
    %Flame Height  
    H=42*D*(mbr/rhoa/sqrt(g*D))^0.61; 
  
    % Burning time  
    tbeq=m/mbr/(pi*(D^2)/4); 
    tbemp=20; %s 
  
    %Actual path length 
    x= sqrt(H^2/4 + sqrt(X.^2+Y.^2)); 
  
    %Partial vapour pressure of water and absorption factor  
    rpwa = .01*rh*exp(spaw-spbw/Ta)*.133e3; 
  
    for i=1:length(x) 
        for j=1:length(x) 
            if(rpwa*x(i,j)>=1e4) && (rpw*x(i,j)<=1e5) 
                ta=2.02/(rpwa*x(i))^0.09; 
            else  
  
            %absortion factor from figure 6.2 (linear estimation) 
            aw=5.746e-2*log10(rpwa*x(i,j))-.148;     
            aco=8.503e-3*log10(rpwa*x(i,j))-7.005e-3; 
  
            %Transmissivity 
            ta=1-aw-aco; 
            end  
            %Heat flux 
            q(i,j)=ta*n*mbr*hc/16/pi/(x(i,j)./D).^2; 
        end 
    end 
  
    % Probit function  
    Ypf= max(-36.38 +2.56.*log(tbemp.*q),0); 
    prob=50*(1 +(Ypf-5)./abs(Ypf-5).*erf(abs(Ypf-5)/sqrt(2)))/100;  
    
    % Structural Damage 
    psd=max(D.^2-(X-3).^2-(Y.^2),0); 
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    psd=min(psd,1); 
else  
    prob=zeros(length(r1)); 
    psd=prob; 
end 
     
end  
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% Jet Fire  %%%%%%%%%% 
%Jet fire modeling (Chamberlain Model: horizontal and vertical release) 
function [W1,W2,Lb0]=jetfire(m,d0,v,thetajv,thermo_data,T0,M,k,Q ) 
%v=wind velocity (m/s) 
%d0=diameter of the role (m) 
%m=mass release rate (Kg/s) 
%x=equipment type  
% Thermodynamic data  
  
  
%% Parameter to be calculated  
%ua=wind speed in the release direction  
%wa=wind speed perpendicular to the release  
  
%% Input parameters  
Ta=298; %K 
pa=101.3e3; %N/m2; 
P0=5.013*101.3e3; %N/m2; 
R=8.314; %J/mole/K 
wmae=2.8835e-2; %Kg/mol; 
g=9.8; %m/s 
  
  
  
%% Calculations  
  
rhoj=thermo_data(2,5);  
wg=M/1000; %Kg/mol 
%Mass fraction  
W=wg/(15.816*wg+0.0395); 
%Temperature of expanding jet  
Tj=T0*((pa/P0)^((k-1)/k)); 
%Static pressure  
Pc=P0*(2/(k+1))^(k/(k-1)); 
  
%Mach-Number  
if (Pc>pa) 
    Mj=sqrt(k+1)*sqrt(((Pc/pa)^((k-1)/k) -1)/(k-1)); 
else 
    F=(3.6233e-5)*m*sqrt(Tj/k/wg)/(d0^2); 
    Mj=sqrt(sqrt(1 +2*(k-1)*F^2 -1)/(k-1));  
end  
  
% Exit velocity of the expading jet  
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  u=Mj*sqrt(k*R*Tj/wg); 
%Ratio of wind speed to jet velocity  
  r=v/u; 
% Density of air  
  rhoa = wmae*pa/(R*Ta); 
% Density of the gas  
  rhoj= rhoj*298/Tj; 
   
% Combustion effective source diameter  
  Ds=sqrt(4*m/pi()/rhoa/u); 
   
  if (Pc>pa) 
      dj=sqrt(4*m/pi/u/rhoj); 
%       rhoj=Pc*wg/R/Tj; 
      Ds=dj*sqrt(rhoj/rhoa); 
  end 
 % Auxiliary variable Y (dimensionless) 
 ca=0.024*(g*Ds/(u^2))^(1/3); 
 cb=0.2; 
 beta= sqrt(wmae*2250/wg/Ta); 
 cc=(beta/W)^(2/3); 
  
 % finding f  
 syms y 
 f=ca*y^(5/3) +cb*y^(2/3)-cc == 0; 
 %Y = solve(f,y) 
 % Newton-Raphson method   
    x=1; 
    x_old=0; 
    it=1; 
    while (abs(x_old-x)>1e-3) 
        x_old=x; 
        x=x_old-(0.2*(cb*x_old^(2/3))+ca*(x_old^(5/3))-
cc)/(2/3*x_old^(-1/3)+(ca*5/3*x_old^(2/3))); 
        it=it+1; 
    end 
    Y=x; 
     
 %Length of the jet flame in still air  
 Lb0=Y*Ds; 
  
 %Length of the jet flame measured from the tip of the flame to the 
centre of the exit plane: 
 Lb=Lb0*0.51*(exp(-0.4*u)+ 0.49)*(1 -6.07e-3*(thetajv-90)); 
  
 % Richardson Number (Ri) 
 Ri=(g/(Ds^2)/(u^2))^(1/3)*Lb0;  
  
 if (r<0.05) 
     alpha=(thetajv-90)*(1-exp(-25.6*r)) +8000*r/Ri; 
 else 
     alpha=(thetajv-90)*(1-exp(-25.6*r)) + (134+1726*sqrt(r-0.026))/Ri;  
 end 
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 % Lift-off of the flame  
 if (alpha==0) 
     b=0.2*Lb; 
 else  
     if (alpha==180) 
         b=0.015*Lb; 
     else  
        K=0.185*exp(-20*r)+0.015; 
        b=Lb*sin(K*alpha)/sin(alpha); 
     end  
 end 
  
 %Length of frustum (rl) 
 rl=sqrt((Lb^2)-(b^2)*(sin(alpha))^2)-b*cos(alpha); 
  
 %density ratio (pair/pj) 
 rrho=Tj*wmae/Ta/wg; 
  
 %Richardson number based on combustion source 
 Rids=(g/(Ds^2)/(u^2))^(1/3)*Ds; 
 C=1000*exp(-100*R)+0.8; 
  
 %frustum base width 
 W1=Ds*(13.5*exp(-6*r)+1.5)*(1-1-1/15*sqrt(rrho))*exp(-
70*(Rids)^(C*r)); 
  
 %Frustum tip width 
 W2=Lb*(0.18*exp(-1.5*r)+0.31)*(1-0.47*exp(-25*r)); 
   
 %Surface area of frustum (m2) 
 A=pi()/4*(W1^2+W2^2) +pi()/2*(W1+W2)*sqrt(rl^2+((W2-W1)/2)^2); 
  
 %Suface emissive power  
 Fs=0.21*exp(-0.00323*u)+0.11; 
 SEP=m*Q*Fs/A; 
  
  
%% Horizontal release Johnson, Brightwell and Carsley Model 
  
%Momentum flux  
pj=rhoa/rrho; 
G=pi()*pj*(u^2)*(dj^2)/4; 
%Ds=dj*sqrt(rhoj/rhoa); 
%Fiding Lb0 
ca=(pi*rhoa*g/4/G)^(1/3); 
cb=(2.85*Ds/W)^(2/3); 
f2(y)=0.2*(y^(2/3))+0.024*ca*(y^(5/3))-cb; 
%Yh=solve(f2,y,'Real',true); 
x=1; 
x_old=0; 
it=1; 
while (abs(x_old-x)>1e-3) 
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    x_old=x; 
    x=x_old-(0.2*(x_old^(2/3))+0.024*ca*(x_old^(5/3))-
cb)/(.4/3*x_old^(-1/3)+(.024*5/3*ca*x_old^(2/3))); 
    it=it+1; 
end 
Lb0=x; 
  
%Richardson Number  
Ri=(pi*rhoa*g/4/G)^(1/3)*Lb0;  
%Mometum fluxes  
    gammax=sqrt(pi*rhoa/4/G)*Lb0*v; 
    %gammaz=sqrt(pi()*pa/4/G)*Lb0*wa; (neglected); 
     
%Position of the flame 
    if (Ri<5.11) 
        fe=0.55*(1-0.55)*exp(-0.168*Ri); 
    else  
        fe=0.55+(1-0.55)*exp(-.168*Ri-0.3*(Ri-5.11)^2); 
    end 
     
    if(Ri<3) 
        re=0; 
    else 
        re=0.82*(1-exp(-.5*(Ri-3.3))); 
    end 
    X=Lb0*fe*(1+re*gammax); 
     
% y position of the flame  
    he=(1+1/Ri)^(-8.78); 
    ce=0.02*Ri; 
    Y=Lb0*he*(1-ce*gammax); 
    if (Y/Lb0>1) 
        Y=Lb0; 
    end  
    Lbxy=sqrt(X^2+Y^2); 
% Maximum Diameter      
    W2=(-0.004 +0.039*Ri-gammax*(0.0094+9.5e-7*(Ri^5)))*Lbxy; 
        
%Lift-off  
    b=0.141*sqrt(G*rhoa); 
%Minimum diameter of the flame  
    W1= (-.18+.081*Ri)*b; 
    if (W1/b<0.12) 
        W1=0.12*b; 
    end 
    if (W2<W1)||(W2>Lbxy) 
        W2=(W1+Lbxy)/2; 
    end     
     
%Z position of the flame  
    %Z=(X-b)*0.178*gammaz; 
     
%Surface area of frustum (m2) 
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 A=pi()/4*(W1^2+W2^2) +pi()/2*(W1+W2)*sqrt(rl^2+((W2-W1)/2)^2); 
  
 %Suface emissive power  
 Fs=0.21*exp(-0.00323*u)+0.14; 
 SEP=m*Q*Fs/A;        
  
end 
  
 
 
 
%%%%%%%%%%%%% BLEVE %%%%%%%%%% 
BLEVE Estimation Acording to CCPS guidelines and TNT model  
  
%% Input Data  
% mawp= maximum allowable work pressure 
% po= failure overpressure  
% Ta= room temperature (K) 
% mf= liquid mass (Kg) 
% mg= gas mass (Kg) 
% d= distance vector (m) 
% f_type= fluid type in case of more than one chemical or mixture  
  
% Chemical Properties of the component  
% psv= operation pressure (Pa) 
% hc=heat of combustion;  
% cp=specific heat; 
% hv=heat of vaporisation ; 
% thermo_data= Thermodynamic data in both states 
  
  
  
%% Environmental Conditions  
rh=20; 
spaw = 15.08; 
spbw = 5514; 
ta=300;  
  
d1=-max(d):hg:max(d); 
% Grid  
[X,Y]=meshgrid(d1,d1); 
  
%Step 1: Data Collection  
p1=po*(mawp+0.1);  
  
%Step 3: Calculate internal energy in expanded state, u2. 
%For saturated liquid  
x=(thermo_data(1,6) -thermo_data(2,6))/(thermo_data(2,7) -
thermo_data(2,6));  
u2f=(1-x)*thermo_data(2,2) +x*thermo_data(2,3); 
% For saturated vapor  
x=(thermo_data(1,7) -thermo_data(2,7))/(thermo_data(2,7) -
thermo_data(2,6));  
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u2g=(x)*thermo_data(2,2) +(1-x)*thermo_data(2,3); 
  
%Step 4: Calculate Specific work  
ef= thermo_data(1,2)-u2f; 
eg= thermo_data(1,3)-u2g; 
beta=0.8; 
  
%Step 5: Calculate the explosion energy  
Eexf=2*ef*mf;% Saturated liquid 
Eexg=2*eg*mg;% Saturated vapor 
Et= Eexf+Eexg; %kJ 
wtnt=beta*0.214*Et/1000; %Kg 
z=sqrt(Y.^2+X.^2)/(wtnt^(1/3));  
delta_p=1616*(1+(z./4.5).^2)./sqrt(1+(z./0.048).^2)./sqrt(1+(z./0.32).^
2)./sqrt(1+(z./1.35).^2); 
  
% Finding Impulse J  
cont=1; 
for i=1:length(d)-2 
    if(X(1,i)<=10) 
        cont=cont+1; 
    else 
        continue 
    end  
end 
  
I(:,:)=335*z.^(-1.06); 
I(1:cont,1:cont)=203.*z(1:cont,1:cont).^(-0.91); 
I=wtnt^(1/3)*I; 
  
  
     
     
  
%% Fireball from TNO "yellow book" 
mt=mg+mf; 
% Radius of the fireball  
rfb=3.24*mt^0.324; %mt=considering that all material will be relased (I 
should improve that) 
  
%Duration of the fireball 
t=.852*mt^0.26; %seconds  
  
%the lift-off height of the fireball  
hb=2*rfb; 
  
%Distance from the centre fo the fireball 
Xt=sqrt(X.^2+Y.^2+hb^2); 
  
%Maximum value of the view factor  
Fv=(rfb./Xt).^2; 
  
%Fraction of the generated heat radiated  
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Fs=0.00325*psv^0.32; 
  
%Net available heat for radiation  
T=1700; %k 
delta_h=hc-hv-cp*T; 
  
%Surface Emissive Power SEP 
SEP=delta_h*mt*Fs/(4*pi()*(rfb^2)*t); 
%Actual path length 
xa=Xt-rfb; 
  
%Partial vapour pressure of water and absorption factor  
rpwa = .01*rh*exp(spaw-spbw/ta)*.133e3; 
  
for i=1:length(xa) 
    for j=1:length(xa) 
        if(rpwa*xa(i,j)>=1e4) && (rpwa*xa(i,j)<=1e5) 
            tau=2.02/(rpwa*xa(i,j))^0.09; 
        else  
  
        %absortion factor from figure 6.2 (linear estimation) 
        aw=5.746e-2*log10(rpwa*xa(i,j))-.148;     
        aco=8.503e-3*log10(rpwa*xa(i,j))-7.005e-3; 
  
        %Transmissivity 
        tau=1-aw-aco; 
        end  
        %Heat flux 
        q(i,j)=SEP*Fv(i,j)*tau; 
    end 
 end 
end  
  
 
 
 
